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INTRODUCTION
I have taught Civil Procedure for the past twenty-five years. Hav-
ing returned to teaching Conflict of Laws last year, after not having
taught that course since the mid-1980s, I was interested in re-examin-
ing the Erie1 doctrine from the vantage point of both of these subject
areas. My goal was to see whether a combination of learning from
these two related disciplines would introduce additional coherence
into the analysis of this topic.
In one sense, the Erie doctrine and traditional choice of law de-
terminations present analogous questions, since they both involve
making a selection between competing legal rules. Choice of law de-
terminations are of course made in a "horizontal" setting, i.e., in de-
termining which state's or country's law to apply to an issue, with
respect to a transaction touching on two or more jurisdictions. Erie,
on the other hand, is implicated in a "vertical" setting, where the ac-
tion is being heard in a federal court based on a claim arising under
state law,2 and where it is necessary to determine whether the federal
court may apply federal law or whether it must apply state law to an
issue in the lawsuit.
One alternative would be for the forum always to apply its own
law-whether that forum is a state court deciding whether to apply its
own rule or that of another jurisdiction, or whether it is a federal
court deciding whether to apply state or federal law. That approach
would certainly be simpler and more efficient. Instead, both choice of
1 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
2 A shorthand way of describing these situations is that Erie commands that fed-
eral courts usually will apply state law in cases brought in those courts based on diver-
sity jurisdiction. In fact, of course, the action may be in federal court because the
plaintiff asserts a federal question, and the state law claim is heard in the exercise of
the federal court's supplemental jurisdiction, or alternatively, the state law claim
arises out of a cross-claim, counterclaim, or third party claim. This Article will also
adhere to the "diversity jurisdiction" convention. See generally Peter Westen &Jeffrey
S. Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REv. 311
(1980).
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law rules and Erie counsel that on some occasions, the forum will, or
even must, defer to the law of another sovereign.
To a large extent, similar reasons underlie this deference.
Among the frequently stated rationales are the desire for uniformity
of outcome; the predictability3 and certainty that flow from that ex-
pected uniformity; the goal of affording faimess to the parties; comity
based on respect for the sovereignty of other jurisdictions and their
interests in the parties and the dispute, and the resultant enhancing
of harmonious relations; facilitation of interstate and international
commerce and travel; promoting ease of judicial administration; and
the oft-cited aphorism, the wish to prevent "forum shopping."4
Yet, there are other motivations. For the most part, the willing-
ness to defer in the horizontal setting to the rules of another jurisdic-
tion is the product of comity.5 In the vertical setting, that deference is
the result of federalism, and it may in fact be required by the Constitu-
tion and/or by statute.
State vs. state6 choice of law and Erie also present other striking
differences. In the horizontal setting, it would not be inappropriate
for the forum, in choosing between the legal rules of more than one
jurisdiction, initially to conclude that either choice would be "correct"
or acceptable. Indeed, it is not unlikely that different fora, applying
different choice of law principles to an identical factual setting, would
resolve to apply the laws of differentjurisdictions to that same transac-
tion. In contrast, in the Erie setting, there can only be one correct
3 This predictability is important both in advance of the dispute, so that the
parties can make plans with knowledge of their likely rights and duties, and also after
the dispute has arisen, so that the parties can assess their potential liability, in part to
weigh the advisability of settlement.
4 See, e.g., Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., 480 N.E.2d 679, 687 (N.Y. 1985) (finding
that reasons for forum state to apply law of parties' common domicile include signifi-
cant reduction in "forum shopping opportunities," rebuttal of charge that "forum-
locus is biased in favor of its own laws and in favor of rules permitting recovery,"
advancement of "concepts of mutuality and reciprocity," and production of "rule that
is easy to apply and brings a modicum of predictability and certainty"). See also RE-
SrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAxvs § 6(2) & cmts. c-k (1971) (identifying
choice of law principles). But cf. Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV.
1677, 1677 (1990) ("[A] ctions described as 'forum shopping' lie on a continuum of
activities, many of which are integral to the legal system and may actually enhance its
capacity to provide needed remedies.... [F] orum shopping in fact furthers legiti-
mate goals of the legal system.").
5 There are, of course, some constitutional limits on a forum's ability to apply its
law to a dispute with which it has few or no contacts. See infra note 158.
6 Throughout this Article, in this horizontal choice of law setting, a "state" may
also include a foreign country.
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answer. Either federal law applies to a particular issue or state law
applies to that issue, but never both.7
In the horizontal setting, there are a variety of choice of law ap-
proaches that have been suggested by courts, by the Restatements,
and by academics, and a state is free to choose among these alterna-
tives. Having opted for one of these methodologies, there are only
limited constraints, of either a constitutional or statutory nature,8 on
the application of that choice in any concrete situation. 9 In contrast,
in the vertical setting, although there is disagreement at the margins
as to the appropriate rules-some of these disagreements prompted
the writing of this Article-for the most part, the limits on this form of
choice of law can be found in the major Supreme Court cases and in
some lower court decisions fleshing out the Erie doctrine. And, as just
noted, Erie's mandate-that a federal court sometimes must apply
state law to particular questions of law-is the product both of consti-
tutional and statutory (principally the Rules of Decision Act 0 )
imperative.
Finally, in the horizontal setting, the basis for choosing between
the laws of different states and of foreign countries is that each has
some contacts with or interest in the parties and the dispute-whether
it be the domicile of the plaintiff or the defendant, the situs of the
tort, the place in which the contract was to be performed, or a myriad
of other possibilities-that support the application of its rules. In the
vertical setting, it is still true that one (or more) state has contacts with
the transaction; however, since by definition the claim in dispute does
7 See Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 727 (1988) ("It is never the case
under Erie that either federal or state law-if the two differ-can properly be applied
to a particular issue .... but since the legislative jurisdictions of the States overlap, it is
frequently the case under the Full Faith and Credit Clause that a court can lawfully
apply either the law of one State or the contrary law of another.") (citation omitted).
8 While the federal constitutional constraints are external to the states, the statu-
tory constraints are self-imposed. For example, although a state would be free to ap-
ply its own statute of limitations to a dispute with which it has few or even no contacts,
see Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988) (discussed infra notes 132-37 and
accompanying text), the majority of states have enacted borrowing statutes, which
mandate that the courts occasionally apply the statute of limitations of another juris-
diction. For the most part, however, choice of law rules are judge-made, and as with
other common law rules, can be altered or modified.
9 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496-97 (1941) ("Subject
only to review by this Court on any federal question that may arise, Delaware is free to
determine whether a given matter is to be governed by the law of the forum or some
other law.... This Court's views are not the decisive factor in determining the appli-
cable conflicts rule.").
10 Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (1994)) (discussed infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text).
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not arise under federal law, the federal court's only "contact" is to
serve as the forum for the resolution of the dispute.
The question then is whether, despite these differences, the simi-
larities are sufficient to allow principles from the choice of law arena
to inform the Erie analysis. Although it is probable that many of the
determinations that must be made by the federal courts would be un-
affected by invocation of learning from horizontal conflict of law de-
terminations, I conclude that some aspects of this methodology-and
particularly interest analysis and other modem policy-based choice of
law principles-would prove useful in the Erie setting. First, the exten-
sion to Erie cases of one important device employed in many modem
conflicts cases-the characterization of certain differences in legal
rules as "false conflicts," leading to the use of the law of the only juris-
diction with a real interest in having its legal rule applied to the dis-
pute-would reduce the number of situations in which Erie questions
must be resolved. In addition, these modem techniques for resolving
"true conflicts" between the laws of two or more states would prove
instructive for resolving clashes between state law and federal judge-
made law.
I. THE ERt DocnruNE: A BRI=F SuRvEY
A. Swift v. Tyson and Erie v. Tompkins
The saga of Harry Tompkins' 1934 encounter with a refrigerator
car operated by the Erie Railroad Company, and the ensuing litiga-
tion, has been retold countless times." Tompkins was walking paral-
lel to the railroad's tracks in Pennsylvania on a frequently used
pathway when he was apparently struck by a door on a refrigerator car
that had not been closed properly; his right arm was severed in the
accident. Relying on the diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts,
Tompkins brought an action in the U.S. District Court for the South-
ern District of New York. Under Pennsylvania's common law, since
Tompkins was a trespasser, the railroad owed him a duty only to avoid
"wanton" or "willful" negligence. In contrast, the federal courts, ap-
plying their own common law rules, had traditionally imposed a
higher duty on landowners in these situations, finding liability for "or-
dinary" negligence.
11 The interesting facts of the accident and the subsequent litigation are de-
scribed in Irving Younger, Observation: What Happened in Erie, 56 TEx. L. REV. 1011'
(1978) and Bob Rizzi, Erie Memoirs Reveal Drama, Tragedy, HAgv. L. REc., Sept. 24,
1976, at 2.
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The federal district court, applying federal law, awarded judg-
ment for Tompkins; that judgment was sustained on appeal to the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.12 In the Supreme Court,
Justice Brandeis framed the issue, not in terms of the conflicting stan-
dards of tort liability, but rather "whether the oft-challenged doctrine
of Swift v. Tyson13 shall now be disapproved."1 4
The Swift decision, handed down in 1842, was principally an anal-
ysis of commercial law issues. 15 However, its subsequent significance
was the limiting interpretation it gave to the so-called Rules of Deci-
sion Act, 16 which was in fact a section of a federal statute dating to the
First Congress in 1789. The Act provides:
[T] he laws of the several states, except where the constitution, trea-
ties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or pro-
vide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law
in the courts of the United States in cases where they apply.17
Swift was a dispute about a bill of exchange that was drawn by two
men-Norton and Keith-who were involved with Tyson in real estate
transactions in the State of Maine. Tyson was the drawee of a bill that
was made payable to Norton; that bill was accepted by Tyson in New
York and then was endorsed by him to Swift. When Swift brought suit
in a federal court in New York to collect on the bill, Tyson attempted
to assert several defenses-including fraud and failure of considera-
tion-that would have been available to him in an action between he
and Norton. 18
Although there was decisional law in New York-including cases
from the highest court of the state-that supported Tyson's position,
Justice Story rejected the contention that the Rules of Decision Act
required the application of that law. He stated that the Act required
only application of the "laws" of the states, and "it will hardly be con-
tended that the decisions of Courts constitute laws. They are, at most,
only evidence of what the laws are, and are not of themselves laws."' 9
12 See Tompkins v. Erie R.R. Co., 90 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1937).
13 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
14 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 69 (1938).
15 Justice Story's discussion of the issue for which the decision has become fa-
mous took up less than a paragraph of the Court's opinion, andJustice Catron's con-
curring decision made no reference to this issue.
16 Judiciary Act, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
17 Id. § 34, 1 Stat. 92 (1789).
18 One element of the failure of consideration defense was that the bill was given
in exchange for a preexisting debt, which assertedly did not constitute "valuable con-
sideration." Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 4.
19 Id. at 18.
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Rather, the Act required deference only to positive statutes of the
state, judicial interpretations of those statutes, "rights and titles to
things having a permanent locality, such as rights and titles to real
estate, and other matters immovable and intraterritorial in their na-
ture and character."20
In contrast, the interpretation and effect of contracts was not to
be done by reference to state decisional law, but rather by considering
general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence. While
the "decisions of the local tribunals upon such subjects are entitled
to ... the most deliberate attention and respect of this Court ... they
cannot furnish positive rules, or conclusive authority, by which our
own judgments are to be bound up and governed."21
Although the rule in Swift may have crept in with a whimper,22
the determination to address its continuation, as noted above, 23 was
done with a bang. Given its longevity and provenance, the Court in
Erie expressed reluctance to overrule Swift.24 However, Justice Bran-
deis concluded that this result was mandated by both the Rules of
Decision Act and the Constitution. While offering a number of other
20 Id.
In fact, it has been argued that:
The true dichotomy stressed in the Swift opinion, therefore, is not that
between decisional and statute law, but rather that between questions of lo-
cal law, where the federal courts are bound by state statutes, and general law,
where they are not; and while "general law" is a vague, undefined term, Story
clearly puts commercial law within its boundaries.
Charles A. Heckman, The Relationship of Swift v. Tyson to the Status of Commercial Law in
the Nineteenth Centuy and the Federal System, 17 Am. J. LEGAL HiST. 246, 248 (1973).
Resolution of this dispute is not essential to the proposals made in this Article.
21 Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 19.
22 See supra note 15. In Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 102-03 (1945),
Justice Frankfurter indicated that similar attitudes towards treatment of state law in
the federal courts had been evinced in cases, including some in the Supreme Court,
predating Swift by at least three decades.
23 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
24 "If only a question of statutory construction were involved, we should not be
prepared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a century. But
the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear, and compels
us to do so." Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77-78 (1938) (footnote
omitted).
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justifications for the Court's holding,25 the Erie Court ultimately relied
on a constitutional imperative for the decision. 26
Interestingly, however, while providing hints, the opinion did not
specifically identify either textual or interstitial sources in the Consti-
tution for the requirement of deference to state law. A variety of pos-
sibilities have been suggested and subsequently criticized.2 7 Among
these are the general federalism fabric of the Constitution; the equal
protection component of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause;28 the Tenth Amendment;29 and Articles I and III of the Con-
stitution.30 Without belaboring the point, since resolution of that
25 In the order in which they were listed in Justice Brandeis's opinion, these rea-
sons included recent research by Professor Charles Warren indicating that Swift had
given erroneous construction to the Rules of Decision Act; Swift had been subject to
widespread criticism; the benefits hoped for from Swift (presumably including in-
creased congruence among legal rules) did not accrue; state courts' persistence in
adhering to their own views of common law issues prevented uniformity; the absence
of clear distinctions between issues of "general law" and of "local law" created yet
another level of uncertainty; the Swift rule introduced grave discrimination by nonci-
tizens against citizens; it prevented uniformity in the administration of the state's laws;
and the Swift doctrine had been urged as a reason to abolish or limit diversityjurisdic-
tion. See id. at 71-72.
26 See supra note 24. In contrast, Justice Reed, in his concurring opinion in Erie,
304 U.S. at 90-92, argued against any view that the Swift doctrine was unconstitutional
and instead urged that it could be rejected merely as a misinterpretation of the Rules
of Decision Act-that the word "laws" in that statute in fact included common law as
well as a state's Constitution and statutes.
27 See, e.g., Abram Chayes, Some Further Last Words on Erie: The Bead Game, 87
HAv. L. REV. 741 (1974);John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV.
693 (1974).
28 Although the Court did not use this concept, it did state that "the [Swift] doc-
trine rendered impossible equal protection of the law." Erie, 304 U.S. at 75. However,
in 1938, the Equal Protection Clause of in the Fourteenth Amendment constituted a
limitation only on the conduct of the states. It was not until years later that the bene-
fits of the Clause were extended through the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
to cover conduct by the federal government. See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954); see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
29 See Erie, 304 U.S. at 78-80 ("[T]he Constitution of the United
States... recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the States-
independence in their legislative and independence in their judicial departments.
Supervision over either the legislative or the judicial action of the States is in no case
permissible except as to matters by the Constitution specifically authorized or dele-
gated to the United States .... [I] n applying the [Swift] doctrine this Court and the
lower courts have invaded rights that in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution
to the several States.").
30 See id. at 78 ("Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common
law applicable in a State whether they be local in their nature or 'general,' be they
commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the Constitution pur-
ports to confer such a power upon the federal courts.").
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question is not important to this Article, my own preference is for a
combination of these latter two alternatives. The authority given to
Congress to create federal courts and to confer subject matterjurisdic-
tion on them does not carry with it the power to create substantive law
in areas beyond the ability of Congress to legislate.3' This conclusion
is supported both by justice Brandeis' famous statement that "[t]here
is no federal general common law"32 and by the coincidental develop-
ment of "federal common law."33 While Erie prohibits the creation by
federal judges of law in areas that fall outside the purview of federal
competence-defined in part by the areas in which Congress could
create positive law34-- the federal courts undoubtedly have the power
to develop "federal common law" in areas where there is a "federal
interest."3 5
B. Basic Principles
1. Is There a Clash Between State and Federal Law?
As a result of several dozen subsequent Supreme Court decisions
(as well as literally thousands of lower court opinions) interpreting
the command of Erie,3 6 the rough outline of this "doctrine" can be
31 See Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 517 (1988) ("Erie put to rest the
notion that the grant of diversity jurisdiction to federal courts is itself authority to
fashion rules of substantive law.") (citing United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co.,
412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973)) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
32 Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
33 The appropriate scope of federal common law is discussed infra notes 238-46
and accompanying text.
34 Limitations on the scope of the federal courts' power to declare rules of fed-
eral common law, and conversely the requirement that federal courts must defer to
state "rules of decision" in areas of general law, are not necessarily coextensive with
the reach of power granted by Article I to the Congress to legislate. In Erie, a major
criticism of the Swift doctrine was that "[t]he federal courts assumed, in the broad
field of 'general law,' the power to declare rules of decision that Congress was confess-
edly without power to enact as statutes." Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
While there may have been doubt in 1938 about whether Congress could have
passed a statute defining the duty of a railroad operating in interstate commerce to-
wards persons walking on its rights-of-way, I assume there would be broad acceptance
today of Congressional power under the Commerce Clause to enact such legislation.
It does not follow that, in the absence of such a statute, a federal court today could
create a federal standard regarding that duty and could disregard a different rule
defined by a state court.
35 See infra notes 238-46 and accompanying text.
36 Erie is certainly one of the most frequently cited of all Supreme Court deci-
sions. As of March 1999, the Westaw KeyCite service indicated that it has been cited
in 8887 subsequent cases and noted that the average Supreme Court case of that
vintage had been cited only 158.7 times.
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summarized as follows: first, when presented with state law that pro-
vides a rule for determining an issue arising in the litigation and when
faced with a different (and therefore conflicting) federal rule, the fed-
eral court must determine whether the federal law actually applies to
the question in dispute.3 7 Sometimes described as whether there truly
is a "collision" or "clash" between federal and state law, this initial in-
quiry indicates that sometimes federal law should be given a more lim-
ited or restricted reading, and so state law, which thus turns out to be
the only rule on point, obviously becomes dispositive. As the descrip-
tion of the Supreme Court cases on this first step will indicate, con-
flicting evaluations of the objectives of various federal rules have led
to results that cannot easily be reconciled.
The principal discussion of this step in the analysis is found in
Walker v. Armco Steel Corp.38 In a tort action that was brought in a
federal court in Oklahoma, the plaintiff filed his complaint with the
court within the requisite two-year period specified by the state statute
of limitations; however, service of process was not made on the de-
fendant until more than two years and three months had elapsed after
the cause of action had accrued. The Oklahoma statute of limitations
provided that an action is not "commenced" until service of process is
accomplished, although it also afforded the plaintiff a sixty-day period
to make service for those complaints that had been filed within the
limitations period. Since neither of these deadlines had been satisfied
and since admittedly the action would not have been timely in state
37 The real first step is to determine the content and scope of both the state rules
and the potentially conflicting federal rules. The federal court's identification of the
content of state law in turn may involve such questions as whether an existing prece-
dent is still good law, whether the state's highest court would follow the decision of a
lower court, and how the state courts would resolve matters of first impression. See
West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236-38 (1940) (finding that federal
court must apply rule announced by intermediate appellate court unless it is con-
vinced by other persuasive data that state supreme court would decide otherwise, and
courts cannot simply apply "better" rule that it thinks the state supreme court ought
to follow); cf Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991) ("[A] court of
appeals should review de novo a district court's determination of state law.").
Although a discussion of these questions is beyond the scope of this Article, I
cannot resist including my favorite Erie quotation, which is found in an opinion by
Judge Friendly: "Our principal task, in this diversity of citizenship case, is to deter-
mine what the New York courts would think the California courts would think on an
issue about which neither has thought." Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 276 F.2d 280,
281 (2d Cir. 1960), judgment set aside and remanded, 365 U.S. 293 (1961). See also Salve
Regina, 499 U.S. at 238 ("The very essence of the Erie doctrine is that the bases of state
law are presumed to be communicable by the parties to a federal judge no less than to
a state judge.").
38 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
[VOL- 74:41244
THE ERIE DOCTRINE REVISITED
court, the defendant moved to dismiss the action. The plaintiff, in
turn, argued that Rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(FRCP), which provides that an "action is commenced by filing a com-
plaint with the court," 9 controlled and that the second step of the
analysis, called for by Hanna v. Plumer,40 was required.
Rejecting this contention, the Supreme Court concluded that
Rule 3 should be given a more limited reading. It stressed that
[a]pplication of the Hanna analysis is premised on a "direct colli-
sion" between the Federal Rule and the state law.... The first ques-
tion must therefore be whether the scope of the Federal Rule in fact
is sufficiently broad to control the issue before the Court. It is only
if that question is answered affirmatively that the Hanna analysis
applies.41
The Court held that Rule 3 governed only "the date from which
various timing requirements of the Federal Rules begin to run"42 and
did not affect or toll state statutes of limitations.43 Instead of clashing,
the Rule and the state statute "can exist side by side, therefore, each
controlling its own intended sphere of coverage without conflict."44
And, in the absence of such a conflict, the policies behind Erie re-
quired application of the state's rule. 45
39 FED. R. Cm. P. 3.
40 380 U.S. 460 (1965). See infra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
41 Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50 (citation omitted).
42 Id. at 751.
43 The Court stated that it did not intend "to suggest that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are to be narrowly construed in order to avoid a 'direct collision' with
state law. The Federal Rules should be given their plain meaning." Id. at 750 n.9.
However, the Court declined to decide whether Rule 3 would even have the sought-
for tolling effect for actions filed under federal law. See id. at 751 n.11. As a number
of commentators have noted, by referring to what may be nonexistent "timing re-
quirements," the more limited scope given to Rule 3 may render it close to
meaningless.
See generally FLEMING JAMES ET AL., CML PROCEDURE 130 (4th ed. 1992) (stating
that Walker involved a "questionable interpretation of the purpose of Rule 3");
George D. Brown, The Ideologies of Forum Shopping-IMy Doesn't Conservative Court Pro-
tect Defendants?, 71 N.C. L. REv. 649, 692 (1993) (asserting that one of "most signifi-
cant aspects of the Walker decision" is "the Court's somewhat strained reading of Rule
3"); Paul Carrington, "Substance" and "Procedure" in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE
L.J. 281, 316 ("Walker is simply an anomaly"); Gregory Gelfand & Howard B. Abrams,
Putting Erie on the Right Track 49 U. PrrT. L. REv. 937, 967 (1988) (attempting to
reconcile Walker with Hanna required "strained explanation" of "clear wording" of a
Federal Rule).
44 Walker, 446 U.S. at 752.
45 See id. at 753 ("There is simply no reason why, in the absence of a controlling
federal rule, an action based on state law which concededly would be barred in the
state courts by the state statute of limitations should proceed through litigation to
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In contrast, in two subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court ex-
pressly found irreconcilable conflicts between the state rule and the
federal law-between a state statute and a Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure (FRAP) in Burlington Northern R.R. Co. v. Woods, 46 and be-
tween a state common law doctrine and a federal statute in Stewart
Organization, Inc. v. Ricoh Corp.47-and then in both cases decided that
federal law would apply.48
In Burlington Northern, Alabama had provided by statute for the
automatic entry of a ten percent penalty against a defendant who un-
successfully contested on appeal an adverse money judgment entered
in the trial court. In contrast, Rule 38 of FRAP gave discretion to the
courts of appeals to award 'Just damages and single or double costs"
upon making a determination that either party had prosecuted a friv-
olous appeal. The Supreme Court concluded that "the Rule's discre-
tionary mode of operation unmistakably conflicts with the mandatory
provision of Alabama's affirmance penalty statute."49
In Stewart, the defendant had made a motion, pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1404(a), to transfer a breach of contract action from a fed-
eral district court in Alabama to a federal court in New York. That
request was justified in part by a forum selection clause in the con-
tract, designating Manhattan as the only location in which litigation
arising out of the contract could be brought. The plaintiff asserted
that transfer should not have been permitted because Alabama
treated forum selection clauses as contrary to public policy, and thus
an Alabama state court would have retained the action. Again zeroing
in on the discretionary and flexible nature of the federal statute, in
contrast to Alabama's categorical rule that focused on a single con-
cern or subset of factors, the Supreme Court found that these ap-
judgment in federal court solely because of the fortuity that there is diversity of citi-
zenship between the litigants.").
46 480 U.S. 1 (1987).
47 487 U.S. 22 (1988).
48 See S.A. Healy Co. v. Milwaukee Metro. Sewerage Dist., 60 F.3d 305 (7th Cir.
1995) (finding no clash between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68's provision for
settlement offers by defendants and a state law permitting plaintiffs to make such
offers).
49 Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 7. The Court also noted that the Alabama stat-
ute, like a similar Mississippi statute, penalized every unsuccessful appeal regardless of
merit, while Rule 38 penalized only frivolous appeals or appeals interposed for pur-
poses of delay. The Court therefore concluded that "the purposes underlying the
Rule are sufficiently coextensive with the asserted purposes of the Alabama statute to
indicate that the Rule occupies the statute's field of operation so as to preclude its
application to federal diversity actions." Id.
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proaches resulted in "two choices in a single 'field of operation,"' 50
and thus, unlike Walker, this was "not a case in which state and federal
rules 'can exist side by side."' 5
Finally, in its most recent Erie decision, Gasperini v. Center For Hu-
manities, Inc.,52 the majority rejected Justice Scalia's assertion that
there was a "direct collision" between the standard for the grant of a
new trial found in FRCP Rule 59 and a state standard for judicial re-
view of the amount of a jury verdict.5 3 Citing Walke~s assertion that
the Federal Rules should be interpreted "with sensitivity to important
state interests and regulatory policies,"54 the Court concluded that
since Rule 59 contained no standard for determining whether dam-
ages were excessive, and since the state law that gave rise to the claim
was the only candidate for making that determination, there was no
"clash" between state law and the Federal Rule.5
5
The apparent inconsistency between these decisions is the prod-
uct of the use of conflicting canons of construction. On the one
hand, the Court has asserted that federal statutes and the Federal
Rules should not be given unnecessarily narrow interpretations. How-
50 Stewart, 487 U.S. at 30 (quoting Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 7). The Court
also explained that the reference in earlier cases, such as Walker and Hanna, to the
determination whether a "direct collision" exists between state and federal law
is not meant to mandate that federal law and state law be perfectly coexten-
sive and equally applicable to the issue at hand; rather, the "direct collision"
language, at least where the applicability of a federal statute is at issue, ex-
presses the requirement that the federal statute be sufficiently broad to
cover the point in dispute.
Id. at 26 n.4.
51 Id. at 31 (quoting Walker, 446 U.S. at 752). See supra note 44 and accompany-
ing text. AsJustice Scalia's dissent and others have argued, it is questionable whether
§ 1404(a) indeed controlled the issue here or whether it deserved a narrower read-
ing, making the federal statute applicable in diversity cases only after it was deter-
mined that state law did not serve as an obstacle to transfer. See also infra notes 68-73
and accompanying text.
See generally Richard D. Freer, Some Thoughts on the State of Erie After Gasperini, 76
TiEx. L. REV. 1637, 1643 (1998) (asserting that Stewart's reading of "vague federal di-
rectives broadly to displace state law" constituted "overzealous application of
Hannd); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Choice of Forum, Another Choice of Law: Consensual
Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 57 FoRn-tAm L. REV. 291, 338 (1988) ("majority
opinion in Ricoh leaves a number of distressing problems and legal anomalies in its
aftermath"); Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, 100 YALE L.J. 1935, 1961-64 (1991)
(criticizing Stewart).
52 518 U.S. 415 (1996) (discussed infra notes 62-67 & 114-15 and accompanying
text).
53 See id. at 468.
54 Id. at 427 n.7.
55 See id. at 437 n.22.
1999] 1.247
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEWo
ever, the Court also seeks to be sensitive to state interests to ensure
that unnecessary clashes between state and federal law may be
avoided. The next Section of this Article will discuss the extent to
which conflicts analysis may help determine the existence of a "colli-
sion" in this vertical setting.56
2. Dealing with a Clash: What Is the Source of the Federal Rule?
As the second step in the analysis, after it is determined that both
rules are on point, the federal court should then identify the source of
the federal rule.57 One can then identify a hierarchy-running from
the Constitution, to federal statutes, to the several sets of Federal
Rules, to federal judge-made law-with regard to the extent to which
federal law must yield to the law of the state.
a. Clashes with the U.S. Constitution
At one end of the spectrum, if the federal rule is the product of
constitutional command, federal law will always prevail, since the Con-
stitution is the supreme law of the land.58 Potential clashes between
the Constitution and state law have principally arisen with respect to
the Seventh Amendment's protection of the right to jury trial and lim-
itations on subsequentjudicial review of ajury's findings. However, in
both of the Supreme Court cases that raised this possibility, the Court
found that the Amendment only "influenced" the result but did not
control the issue and, thus, did not command yielding to the constitu-
tional provision.
At issue in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.,59 was
whether the federal courts had to defer to a state's allocation of deci-
sionmaking responsibility to ajudge rather than to ajury with respect
to a specific and disputed issue or whether they could follow the fed-
eral practice of using the jury as fact-finder. The Court declined to
decide whether the Seventh Amendment spoke to this particular ques-
56 See infra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
57 The source of the state law is irrelevant. By rejecting the distinction in Swift v.
Tyson between positive and "general" law, one of the key conclusions of Erie was that
all state law-whetherjudge-made or the product of the legislative process-is equally
"law" for purposes of the Rules of Decision Act.
58 "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land." U.S. CONST. art. VI,
§ 2.
59 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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don 60 and instead decided, as discussed below,61 to apply the federal
approach for other reasons.
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,62 involved application of
the second half of the Seventh Amendment-the Re-examination
Clause-which forbids a court from re-examining a fact tried by ajury
other "than according to the rules of the common law."63 The New
York legislature had enacted a statute requiring the state internediate
appellate courts to determine whether a jury award was excessive or
inadequate based on whether it "deviates materially from what would
be reasonable compensation."64 Judicial interpretation had extended
this obligation to the state trial courts. At issue was whether federal
courts in New York hearing a diversity case were required to follow
this standard or whether they should use the more deferential tradi-
tional federal standard, under which a verdict is set aside only if it
"shocks the conscience" of the court.
Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion and Justice Scalia's dissent
gave different readings to the pre-1791 history of judicial review of
jury decisions, with the majority concluding that the standard to be
applied could not be derived from the commandment of the Seventh
Amendment. However, both opinions apparently agreed that had the
pre-1791 common law, which was incorporated into the Constitution
by the Seventh Amendment, absolutely prohibited such judicial re-
view, the federal courts would have had to follow the constitutional
command, irrespective of any Erie-type considerations. 65
Similarly, despite the disagreements in Gasperini, there is no ques-
tion that there would have to be a right to trial by jury in a federal
court in a diversity case seeking monetary relief, even if the state court
60 Justice Brennan first stated that the distribution of trial functions between the
judge and jury was done "under the influence-if not the command-of the Seventh
Amendment." Id. at 537 (footnote omitted). The Court then added that "[o]ur con-
clusion makes unnecessary the consideration of-and we intimate no view upon-the
constitutional question whether the right of jury trial protected in federal courts by
the Seventh amendment embraces the factual issue [involved here]." Id. at 537 n.10.
61 See infra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
62 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
63 "[N]o fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the
United States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CONST. amend.
VII.
64 N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5501(c) (McKinney 1995).
65 For example, had the state abolished jury trials altogether, the parties would
still have been entitled to ajury in the federal courts even if it were clear that the only
reason that the plaintiff (or the defendant by removal) had opted for federal court
was to obtain the benefit of ajury trial.
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had expressly abolished that right.66 Conversely, there need not be a
jury trial in a federal court action in which the plaintiff is seeking
purely equitable relief, even if the state court would accord that right
in the same action.
67
b. Clashes with Federal Statutes
The obligation to follow federal statutes that conflict with state
law is only slightly less strong. As discussed above,68 in Stewart the
Supreme Court had to decide whether to apply the flexible standards
of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) for transfer of an action from one federal dis-
trict court to another, based in part on a forum selection clause, in the
face of state decisional law treating such clauses as unenforceable be-
cause they were contrary to the state's public policy. The Court chose
to ignore the state rule, holding instead that a federal procedural stat-
ute that controls the issue "must be applied if it represents a valid
exercise of Congress's authority under the Constitution. '69 Although
66 See Simler v. Conner, 372 U.S. 221, 222 (1963); Gipson v. KAS Snacktime Co.,
83 F.3d 225, 230 (8th Cir. 1996).
67 In Herron v. Southern Pacific Co., 283 U.S. 91, 94 (1931), the Court held that a
federal judge sitting in a diversity case could take an action away from the jury and
direct a verdict, notwithstanding a provision in the Arizona Constitution that the de-
fenses at issue in the case "shall, in all cases whatsoever, be a question of fact and shall,
at all times, be left to the jury." Id. at 92. Rejecting the argument that the Rules of
Decision Act compelled deference to the state constitution, the Court held that "state
laws cannot alter the essential character or function of a federal court." Id. at 94.
In Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), the Court
relied heavily on Herron. While conceding that it was decided before 1938, Justice
Brennan noted that even pre-Erie, federal courts had a duty to defer to the positive
law of the states; nonetheless, "the strong federal policy against allowing state rules to
disrupt the judgejury relationship in the federal courts," id. at 533, compelled use of
a federal standard to determine the availability of a right to a jury trial.
See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 465 (1996) ("[N]o
one would argue that Erie confers a right to a jury in federal court wherever state
courts would provide it; or that, were it not for the Seventh Amendment, Erie would
require federal courts to dispense with the jury whenever state courts do so.") (Scalia,
J., dissenting); Goar v. Compania Peruana de Vapores, 688 F.2d 417, 423-24 (5th Cir.
1982).
Although there is no authority on point, it is arguable that a contrary result
should occur if the right to trial by jury is treated by the state as bound up with, and is
essential to, the cause of action, so that the use of ajury as the trier of fact is viewed by
the state as a "substantive" element of the claim.
68 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
69 Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 31-32 (1988). Because of congres-
sional power found in Article III, as augmented by the Necessary and Proper Clause,
to prescribe rules governing procedure in the federal courts, a statute that is capable
of classification as "procedural" will pass constitutional muster. However, because the
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the decision did not mention the Supremacy Clause, the unmistakable
conclusion is that subject only to that determination, a federal statute
will always prevail over an inconsistent state law.70
This result is flawed in two respects. First, it is true that vertical
forum shopping to obtain a more favorable rule was not at issue in
this case since the plaintiff had opted for federal court. But the
Court's holding would apply equally in the future if a plaintiff were to
commence an action in state court and then the defendant chose to
remove the case in order to get the benefit of the federal transfer
alternative, in a situation in which Alabama's rule clearly would have
locked the defendant into litigating in that state had the action re-
mained in state court. Furthermore, the transfer alternative became
available only because the parties happened to be citizens of different
states. 71
Second, the holding also treated as irrelevant whatever policies-
which the Court dismissed as not even worthy of discussion 72-
animated Alabama's antipathy to forum selection clauses. Instead, the
Court flatly rejected these concerns: "Because a validly enacted Act of
Congress controls the issue in dispute, we have no occasion to evalu-
ate the impact of application of federal judge-made law on the 'twin
aims' that animate the Erie doctrine. '73
forum in which a contract dispute is litigated certainly can affect the resolution of
disputed issues, Alabama's decision to keep such litigation in-state may well have been
part of the state's "substantive" law, and thus, the application of § 1404(a) here may
have failed even the "arguably procedural" test.
70 "If Congress intended to reach the issue before the district court, and if it
enacted its intention into law in a manner that abides with the Constitution, that is
the end of the matter .... ." Id. at 27.
71 Justice Scalia noted this incentive for forum shopping:
With respect to forum-selection clauses, in a State with law unfavorable to
validity, plaintiffs who seek to avoid the effect of a clause will be encouraged
to sue in state court, and non-resident defendants will be encouraged to
shop for more favorable law by removing to federal court.
Id. at 40 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72 In fact, although the court of appeals had discussed Alabama's policies for its
rule, the Court stated that "[o]ur determination that § 1404(a) governs the parties'
dispute notwithstanding any contrary Alabama policy makes it unnecessary to address
the contours of state law." Id. at 30 n.9.
73 Id at 32 n.11. These "twin aims" are discussed infra notes 101-07 and accom-
panying text.
As discussed supra note 69, because of the arguably "substantive" nature of the
Alabama rule, it is questionable whether the application of § 1404(a) to this situation
passed constitutional muster. A consideration of these state policies would have
helped to inform a determination whether Alabama's rule was indeed "substantive."
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c. Clashes with Federal Rules
Virtually irrebuttable presumptions also apply in favor of applica-
tion of a Federal Rule in preference to a conflicting state procedural
rule. As illustrated by the Walker case discussed above, 7 4 it is true that
on several occasions the Supreme Court has declined to apply a Fed-
eral Rule, giving it a more limited reach and therefore finding that it
did not extend to the issue in question and leaving only the state law
to occupy the area.75 However, the Court has stated that "if the Rule
in point is consonant with the Rules Enabling Act and the Constitu-
tion, the Federal Rule applies regardless of contrary state law."76 In
fact, in all of the Supreme Court decisions in which the Rule's cover-
age was found to be coextensive with the state law, the Federal Rule
prevailed. 77 And, given the Court's statement in Hanna that:
74 See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
75 See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996); Walker v.
Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541, 556 (1949) (giving limited reading to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 to
find no conflict with state statute that required plaintiff to post bond as precondition
to assertion of shareholder's derivative action against corporation); Ragan v.
Merchants Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (similar facts to Walker);
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117 (1943) ("[Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c)]
covers only the manner of pleading. The question of the burden of establishing con-
tributory negligence is a question of local law which federal courts in diversity of citi-
zenship cases must apply.") (citations omitted).
76 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 n.7 (citation omitted).
A Federal Rule will satisfy the constitutional constraints if it is "indisputably pro-
cedural." Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987) (quoting Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965)). A Federal Rule will satisfy the standards of the
Rules Enabling Act if it is a rule of practice, procedure, or evidence, and if it does not
"abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1994). A few of
the major cases discussing these requirements under the Act are noted infra note 77.
An extended discussion of these limits is beyond the scope of this Article. It is very
important to note, however, as discussed infra notes 129-44 and accompanying text,
that the characterization of an issue as "substantive" or "procedural" may be quite
different depending on whether the inquiry is made for Erie or for horizontal choice
of law purposes.
77 See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1 (1987); Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460 (1965); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
In Sibbach, the plaintiff had sustained injuries in an accident in Indiana and she
brought suit for her damages in federal district court in Illinois. While Indiana
courts, like the federal courts, permitted physical examination of parties as a part of
pretrial discovery, such compelled examination was not permitted in the state courts
in Illinois. Resisting the defendant's motion made under Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 35, the plaintiff argued that the Rule exceeded the authority given to the Court
by the Rules Enabling Act.
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[W] hen a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the ques-
tion facing the court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided
Erie choice: the court has been instructed to apply the Federal Rule,
and can refuse to do so only if the Advisory Committee, this Court,
and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment that the Rule in
question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor con-
stitutional restrictions[,] 78
it seems unlikely that any future challenge to an applicable Federal
Rule will prove successful. 79
In Burlington Northern, the most recent Supreme Court decision
presenting a direct clash between state law and a Federal Rule, this
Without any citation of Erie, the Court dismissed any suggestion that congruence
between the federal and Illinois practices was required. "[I]f [the Rules] are within
the authority granted by Congress, ... the District Court was not bound to follow the
Illinois practice respecting an order for physical examination." Id. at 10. Instead, the
Court's opinion focused on the requirement of the Act that the Rules "shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right." 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1998).
The plaintiff had urged that even if the Rule was "procedural," the limitation in
§ 2072(b) reflected congressional intent "that in regulating procedure this court
should not deal with important and substantial rights theretofore recognized." Sib-
bach, 312 U.S. at 13. Because of concern that this approach would "invite endless
litigation and confusion worse confounded," id. at 14, the Court rejected this expan-
sive view of "substantive rights" and instead adopted a narrower test: "The test must be
whether a rule really regulates procedure-the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering remedy and
redress for disregard or infraction of them." Id.
In Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946), a defendant doing
business solely in the Southern District of Mississippi challenged the authority con-
ferred by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f), which permitted the plantiff to serve it
with process in the Northern District of the state, apparently in conflict with the state
court's venue provisions. Concluding that this modest expansion with respect to ser-
vice of process was consistent with the Rules Enabling Act, the Court stated: "Con-
gress' prohibitiori of any alteration of substantive rights of litigants was obviously not
addressed to such incidental effects as necessarily attend the adoption of the pre-
scribed new rules of procedure upon the rights of litigants .... " Id. at 445.
See also Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., Inc., 498
U.S. 533, 553 (1991) ("Imposing monetary sanctions on parties that violate the [re-
quirements of] Rule [11] may confer a benefit on other litigants, but the Rules En-
abling Act is not violated by such incidental effects on substantive rights."); Burlington
Northern, 480 U.S. at 5 ("Rules which incidentally affect litigants' substantive rights do
not violate this provision if reasonably necessary to maintain the integrity of that sys-
tem of rules.").
78 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.
79 Justice Harlan, in his concurrence, noted that under this standard a Federal
Rule would invariably be found controlling: "Since the members of the Advisory Com-
mittee, the Judicial Conference, and this Court who formulated the Federal Rules are
presumably reasonable men, it follows that the integrity of the Federal Rules is abso-
lute." Id. at 476 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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presumption was invoked in a setting that should have raised substan-
tial Erie considerations-but that the Court completely ignored. As
noted above, 80 Alabama had provided by statute for the automatic en-
try of a penalty against a defendant who unsuccessfully contested on
appeal an adverse money judgment entered in the trial court, while
Rule 38 of FRAP left it to the discretion of the courts of appeals to
award damages and costs to either party upon a showing that the ap-
pellant had prosecuted a frivolous appeal. Reiterating the Hanna ap-
proach, the Court held, in a unanimous decision, that if the state law
and the Federal Rule were in "direct collision," the latter "must then be
applied if it represents a valid exercise of Congress' rulemaking
authority."8 1
This result suffers from the same defects as were noted regarding
Stewart. The Court ignored the possibility that the defendant, who in
fact did remove the case from the state court, might have opted for
the federal forum precisely to get the benefit of the less onerous fed-
eral penalty scheme.8 2 And, it also accorded no deference to several
of Alabama's interests, which the Court specifically identified83 as the
state's reasons for imposing its automatic penalty requirement.84
d. Clashes with Federal Judge-Made Law
What, then, is left for Erie analysis? As a practical matter, serious
inquiry only remains when a state rule clashes with a federal proce-
80 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
81 Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 5 (emphasis added). Applying the standards
summarized supra notes 36-49, the Court found that Rule 38 could reasonably be
classified as procedural and that it satisfied the standards of the Rules Enabling Act
since the "choice ... in favor of a discretionary procedure affects only the process of
enforcing litigants' rights and not the rights themselves." Id. at 8.
82 Although there was no evidence of such a motivation here, it is certainly not
beyond the realm of possibility that a defendant, calculating the possibility of an ini-
tial loss in the trial court and not wanting to bear the risk that an appeal might subject
it to an automatic penalty, might then opt to remove the case to avoid this draconian
result.
83 See Burlington Northern, 480 U.S. at 4 ("The purposes of the mandatory affirm-
ance penalty are to penalize frivolous appeals and appeals interposed for delay...
and to provide 'additional damages' as compensation to the appellees for having to
suffer the ordeal of defending the judgments on appeal.") (citation omitted).
84 It is certainly arguable that the first of these purposes is directed at deterring
appeals in the state system because of the systemic cost they impose and because Ala-
bama might be indifferent as to similar impositions on the federal system resulting
from appeals. The second goal, however, of compensating plaintiffs for the expense,
delay, and uncertainty in seeking to preserve their judgment on appeal is implicated
regardless of the nature of the forum.
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dural rule that is the product of judge-made law.85 The Supreme
Court has provided some guidance on this question. But it is the am-
biguities that still remain in resolving those clashes that are the subject
of the balance of this Article.
3. Approaches for Resolving Clashes
The test for choosing between a state law and conflicting federal
common law reflects an amalgam of four sometimes overlapping ap-
proaches. These methodologies have been used by the Court at dif-
ferent times in different cases, and they may not all have equal
present-day validity.
a. Substantive-Procedural
First, Erie itself stands for the proposition that when the issues are
"substantive," state law controls.8 6 In Byrd, the Court asserted as a first
principle that in diversity cases the federal courts were required to
apply "state-created rights and obligations."8 7
More recently, the Supreme Court has asserted the opposite
proposition: "Only when there is a conflict between state and federal
substantive law are the concerns of Erie... at issue."88 In Gasperini,
the Court reiterated this misleading assertion: "Under the Erie doc-
85 Because of the occupation of much of the procedural landscape by the Federal
Rules and the growth in federal statutes, the number of unresolved questions contin-
ues to diminish.
86 Justice Brandeis' opinion in Erie only used the term "substantive" once, and
then principally as a limitation on congressional power: "There is no federal general
common law. Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of common law
applicable in a state .... And no clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a
power upon the federal courts." Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
The inference that Erie offered a "substantive-procedural" dichotomy as a test for
the situations in which federal courts must defer to state law is supported both by the
fact that the issue in question there-the duty of the railroad to a trespasser-was
clearly substantive and by the coincidence in 1938 of the Erie decision and the effec-
tiveness of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which substituted a uniform set of
procedural rules in the federal courts for the former regime under the Conformity
Act, whereby each federal court looked to the rules of procedure of the state in which
the court sat.
87 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958); see also id.
("[T]he federal courts in diversity cases must respect the definition of state-created
rights and obligations by the state courts. We must, therefore, first examine the
[state] rule.., to determine whether it is bound up with these rights and obligations
in such a way that its application in the federal court is required.").
88 Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 52 (1991) (citation omitted).
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trine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law and
federal procedural law."89
In fact, these statements do not reflect the reality of decisions
such as Guaranty Trust v. York90 and Gasperini itself, in both of which
the Court held that the federal courts may have to defer to state laws
that have both procedural and substantive qualities. And, quite apart
from whether this distinction captures the policy behind the Erie doc-
trine, it also suffers from two additional defects: there is an absence of
agreement on what issues are substantive,9' and this "test" fails to ad-
dress the proper resolution of hybrid or mixed questions92 since, de-
pending on the context, the same issue can be either procedural or
substantive. 93
89 Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). See also
Salve Regina College v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 226 (1991) ("Erie mandates that a fed-
eral court sitting in diversity apply the substantive lav of the forum State, absent a
federal statutory or constitutional directive to the contrary.").
90 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
91 "Classification of a law as 'substantive' or 'procedural' for Erie purposes is
sometimes a challenging endeavor." Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427. "The Court commits
the classic Erie mistake of regarding whatever changes the outcome as substantive."
Id. at 465 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1941),
and note 77, supra, for a discussion of the test for "substantive rights" limitation in the
Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1994).
92 In Gasperini, Justice Ginsburg noted that New York's "deviates materially" stan-
dard for judicial review ofjury awards was both "substantive," in that it controlled how
much a plaintiff could be awarded, and "procedural," in that it assigned decisionmak-
ing authority to the state's courts. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 426. The Court ultimately
concluded, however, that the statute was predominantly substantive, noting the par-
ties' agreement that a statutory cap on damages clearly would constitute substantive
law for Erie purposes. "In sum, § 5501 (c) contains a procedural instruction, but the
State's objective is manifestly substantive." Id. at 429 (citation omitted).
93 See Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 108-09. As the Court stated:
Matters of "substance" and matters of "procedure" are much talked
about in the books as though they defined a great divide cutting across the
whole domain of law. But, of course, "substance" and "procedure" are the
same key-words to very different problems. Neither "substance" nor "proce-
dure" represents the same invariants.
And so the question is not whether a statute of limitations is deemed a
matter of "procedure" in some sense. The question is whether such a statute
concerns merely the manner and the means by which a right to recover, as
recognized by the State, is enforced, or whether such statutory limitation is a
matter of substance in the aspect that alone is relevant to our problem,
namely, does it significantly affect the result of a litigation for a federal court
to disregard a law of a State that would be controlling in an action upon the
same claim by the same parties in a State court?
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b. Outcome-Determination
Second, Guaranty Trust proposed an "outcome-determination"
test. The federal courts were viewed as offering an alternative forum
for the parties when they were of diverse citizenship, but not a differ-
ent body of law.94 Therefore, even with respect to some issues that
might possibly be classified as procedural or a mixture of procedure
and substance,9 5
in all cases where a federal court is exercising jurisdiction solely be-
cause of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the outcome of
the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so
far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would
be if tried in a State court.9 6
94 See infta note 155 and accompanying text.
95 At issue in Guaranty Trust was whether, in a diversity action in which the plain-
tiff sought equitable relief, the federal court must apply the state's statute of limita-
tions. See infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
96 Guaranty Trust, 326 U.S. at 109 (emphasis added). Reiterating this standard,
the Court asserted that "the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a federal
court instead of in a State court a block away should not lead to a substantially differ-
ent result." Id.
A few years later, the Court applied the rule announced in Guaranty Trust in
Colen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), to a state statute requir-
ing a plaintiff who unsuccessfully prosecuted a shareholders' derivative action to pay
for all expenses and attorney's fees incurred by the corporation in defending the
action and further requiring the plaintiff to post a bond for those expenses as a pre-
condition to litigating. Justice Jackson concluded that even if the plaintiff's character-
ization of the statute as procedural were accepted, this was not dispositive of the Erie
issue since the statute also created a new substantive liability. "We do not think a
statute which so conditions the stockholder's action can be disregarded by the federal
court as a mere procedural device." Id. at 556.
On the same day, the Court held in Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535
(1949), that Mississippi's "door-closing" statute, which required foreign corporations
to file a written power of attorney designating an agent on whom service of process
could be made as a precondition of access to "any of the courts of this state," equally
barred access to noncomplying corporations to the federal courts in the state:
The York case was premised on the theory that a right which local law
creates but which it does not supply with a remedy is no right at all for pur-
poses of enforcement in a federal court in a diversity case; that where in such
cases one is barred from recovery in the state court, he should likewise be
barred in the federal court.
Id. at 538.
Two years previously, in Angel v. Bullington, 330 U.S. 183 (1947), the Supreme
Court had also held that the federal courts must follow a state "door-closing" statute.
A citizen of Virginia had sold land in Virginia to a North Carolina citizen. After the
purchaser defaulted on one of the notes, the seller foreclosed on the land and then
brought an action for the deficiency in a North Carolina state court. Relying on a
North Carolina statute that precluded recovery of such deficiencies, the North Caro-
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This second approach was subsequently modified and qualified
in Hanna, which is discussed below.97 "Outcome-determination" suf-
fers from the fact that it does not fully reflect all of the policies under-
lying Erie.98 Furthermore, it fails to take complete account of the fact
that a litigant's choice of federal court rather than state court almost
always will reflect the judgment that, for whatever reason, the chances
for success are enhanced, at least to some extent, in that forum. In-
deed, the possibility of discrimination in the state courts has been sug-
gested as a principal motivation for the provision in Article III for the
alternative of a federal forum where the parties are citizens of differ-
ent states. 99 Thus, a requirement that any difference in rules that
causes a nontrivial difference in outcome would require application of
state law would cast far too large a net. Finally, this test turns on po-
tentially varying interpretations of what differences in outcome will be
viewed as "substantial."100
lina Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of the claim. Although of a different form
than the statute in Woods, this statute was also a form of "door-closing" since it would
appear that had the seller been able to obtain personal jurisdiction over the pur-
chaser in Virginia, the courts of that state would have permitted the action. Instead of
appealing to the Supreme Court, the seller next brought a claim for the deficiency in
a federal court in North Carolina. Because that action would have been barred under
the principle of res judicata in state court, the Supreme Court concluded that it
would also have to be barred in federal court:
The essence of diversityjurisdiction is that a federal court enforces State
law and State policy. If North Carolina has authoritatively announced that
deficiency judgments cannot be secured within its borders, it contradicts the
presuppositions of diversity jurisdiction for a federal court in that State to
give such a deficiency judgment .... A federal court in North Carolina,
when invoked on grounds of diversity of citizenship, cannot give that which
North Carolina has withheld.
Id. at 191-92.
97 While not relying on "outcome determination" as a test, the Court in Gasperini
felt compelled to "address the question whether New York's 'deviates materially' stan-
dard, codified in CPLR § 5501(c), is outcome-affective," Gasperini, 518 U.S. 415, 428
(1996) and concluded that it "influences outcomes by tightening the range of tolera-
ble awards," id. at 425.
98 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-67 (1965) ("'Outcome-determination'
analysis was never intended to serve as a talisman. Indeed, the message of York itself is
that choices between state and federal law are to be made not by application of any
automatic, 'litmus paper' criterion, but rather by reference to the policies underlying
the Erie rule.").
99 See Abolition of Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction, H.R. REP. No. 95-893, at 2
(1978).
100 Two cases decided by the Supreme Court between Guaranty Trust and Hanna
illustrate the difficulty of ascertaining which differences in outcome are sufficiently
"substantial" to require following the state law.
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c. Twin Aims of Erie
Hanna proposed a third approach, asserting that "[t]he 'out-
come-determination' test therefore cannot be read without reference
to the twin aims of the Erie rule: discouragement of forum shopping
and avoidance of the inequitable administration of the [state's]
laws."101 This modification was necessary because, ex post, any differ-
In Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 (1956), the parties had
entered into an employment contract containing an agreement to arbitrate. After the
dispute arose, the plaintiff brought, in a state court in Vermont, an action that the
defendant subsequently removed. Vermont state law provided that agreements to ar-
bitrate were revocable. Honoring that policy, the federal district court granted a stay
of arbitration. The Second Circuit, treating this as a question of "procedure," re-
versed and ordered arbitration pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act. Again revers-
ing, the Supreme Court held that the contract in dispute did not fall within the Act
and furthermore that Guaranty Trust required deference to state law because the kind
of forum-court or arbitrator-was significant to the outcome. The Court explained:
If the federal court allows arbitration where the state court would disal-
low it, the outcome of litigation might depend on the courthouse where suit
is brought. For the remedy of arbitration ... substantially affects the cause
of action created by the State .... The change from a court of law to an
arbitration panel may make a radical difference in ultimate result.
Id. at 203.
In contrast, in Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525
(1958), discussed supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text, while conceding that
"the nature of the tribunal which tries issues may be important in the enforcement of
the parcel of rights making up a cause of action or defense, and bear significantly
upon achievement of uniform enforcement of the right," id. at 537, the Court, distin-
gnishing Bernhardt, stated that there was "not present here ... even the strong possi-
bility," id. at 539, and that the choice between judge and jury as trier of fact would
actually affect the outcome.
101 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468. This discussion was, in any event, extended dictum
since the holding in Hanna as discussed supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text,
was that Rule 4(d) (1) prevailed because it satisfied the standards of the Rules En-
abling Act-irrespective of any Erie-type concerns.
See Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 428 (1996) (explain-
ing in Hanna "that the 'outcome-determination' test must not be applied mechani-
cally to sweep in all manner of variations; instead, its application must be guided by
'the twin aims of the Erie rule'"); see also Stewart Org. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 27
n.6 (1988) ("If no federal statute or Rule covers the point in dispute, the district court
then proceeds to evaluate whether application of federal judge-made law would dis-
serve the so-called 'twin aims' of the Erie rule .... If application of federal judge-
made law would disserve these two policies, the district court should apply state law.").
The Court in Gasperini properly declined to view the case as one involving
problems of forum shopping. It is unlikely that a plaintiff would opt for federal
rather than state court because of the different standard of appellate review in those
two courts, especially since under the New York standard, the trial judge had greater
freedom to revise a verdict both upward and downward.
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ence in rules might affect the outcome of the litigation. Thus, as in
Hanna, if one were to insist that even in the federal courts service of
process could only be made consistent with state practice, the plain-
tiff's compliance with a mode of service only approved by the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure would necessitate dismissal of the action
rather than proceeding with the merits. But this difference, the Court
noted, "would be of scant, if any, relevance to the choice of a fo-
rum."' 0 2 Erie does not command adherence to state law with respect
to such trivial differences that are unrelated to the adjudication of the
merits of the claim.1 0 3
The second of these "twin aims" has a dual component. Yielding
to state law is intended to accord respect to the state's interests in the
regulation of conduct within its borders and in the enforcement of
rights and obligations by persons subject to its control. 10 4 The scope
102 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 469.
103 See id. at 468 ("Not only are nonsubstantial, or trivial, variations not likely to
raise the sort of equal protection problems which troubled the Court in Erie they are
also unlikely to influence the choice of a forum.").
104 An excellent example of improper federal interference with a state's determi-
nations with regard to the ordering of conduct within its boundaries or of persons
subject to its control was Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow
Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518 (1928)-a decision cited in Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73-74 (1938), as emblematic of the criticism of the Swift
doctrine.
Brown & Yellow, which was a Kentucky corporation, had signed a contract with
the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, also a Kentucky corporation, allowing it exclusive
rights to operate a taxicab service at the Railroad's Bowling Green, Kentucky, train
station. The Kentucky courts had held similar contracts to be invalid under that
state's common law as detrimental to competition and harmful to the public.
After Black & White, also a Kentucky corporation, began taxicab operations at
the train station without objection by the Railroad, Brown & Yellow reincorporated in
Tennessee, with all of the assets and rights of the Kentucky corporation then transfer-
ring to the new corporation. Brown & Yellow then brought an action against Black &
White and the Railroad in a federal court in Kentucky, seeking injunctive relief to
require enforcement of its contract rights.
Relying on a line of cases dating back to Swift v. Tyson, the Supreme Court held
that the federal courts were free to disregard Kentucky's common law rules and in-
stead apply their own distinct common law doctrine: "The applicable rule sustained
by many decisions of this court is that in determining questions of general law, the
federal courts, while inclining to follow the decisions of the courts of the State in
which the controversy arises, are free to exercise their own independent judgment."
Black & White Taxicab, 276 U.S. at 530.
It needs no emphasis to note that the consequence of this approach-combined
with the acceptance of the easy availability of a federal forum subsequent to the
reincorporation in another state-was to leave Kentucky powerless to implement the
public policy declared by its highest courts. By differentiating between common law
and statutory law, this jurisprudential approach meant that Kentucky could forbid
126o [VOL. 74:4
THE ERIE DOCTRINE REVISITED
of this second "aim" is limited, however, by the recognition that these
interests do not necessarily extend to the mode of enforcing those
rights.
This concern for deference to state-created law is also described
as an attempt to guard against "discrimination." However, here this
term is not intended to protect a particular class of parties (for exam-
ple, defendants or out-of-state litigants), but instead to avoid affording
to one party to the litigation an expanded set of legal rules that would
be unavailable when the parties were citizens of the same state.' 0 5
The Supreme Court looked to these "twin aims" in Chambers v.
Nasco, Inc. 06 to support its conclusion that Erie did not prohibit a fed-
eral court's use of its inherent powers to sanction a litigant for bad
faith conduct in the course of litigating a state law claim, although the
state court's adherence to the American rule might have prevented
the imposition there of any such type of fee-shifting. Since the imposi-
tion of sanctions did not depend on which party prevailed in the liti-
gation, but rather on how the parties conducted themselves, there was
no risk that they would opt for the forum based on the federal rule.
Thus, it was not inequitable to apply the rule only to cases in federal
court since "the party, by controlling his or her conduct in litigation,
has the power to determine whether sanctions will be assessed."' 0 7
such contracts only by legislative, rather than judicial, action, and that a state's deci-
sion of how primary conduct should be regulated under common law rules could be
disregarded or circumvented.
105 This concern about disparate treatment often contains references to federal
law that favors the noncitizen or the plaintiff. Thus, in Erie, Justice Brandeis asserted
that "Swift v. Tyson introduced grave discrimination by non-citizens against citizens."
Erie, 304 U.S. at 74. However, assuming no problems with personal jurisdiction, a
citizen of the state may also opt to sue the noncitizen in a federal court located in the
plaintiff's home state to get the benefit of federal law. In addition, if no defendant is
a citizen of the state in which the action is brought, he or she may remove to federal
court to obtain those benefits. Therefore, the key objection is to the possibility of
having two different rules in two different courts, applicable to an identical dispute
arising under state law, depending on the diversity or nondiversity of the parties.
This sounder understanding of "discrimination" is reflected in the Court's state-
ment in Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 204 (1956), discussed
supra note 100: "There would in ourjudgment be a resultant discrimination if the
parties suing on a Vermont cause of action in the federal court [in Vermont] were
remitted to arbitration, while those suing in the Vermont [state] court could not be."
106 501 U.S. 32 (1991).
107 Id. at 53.
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d. Balancing Federal and State Interests
A fourth approach may be discerned in Byrd and Gasperin identi-
fying the interests both of the federal courts and of the state that is the
source of the substantive rule, and attempting to weigh and balance
those interests.10 8 While some commentators believed that this ap-
proach was merely a "throw-away" in Byrd, which therefore could be
ignored in light of its disuse by the Supreme Court for more than
three decades, 10 9 the Gasperini Court's renewed attention to consider-
ation of federal and state interests supports reliance on this methodol-
ogy for resolving Erie conflicts.
In Byrd,'10 by effectively minimizing the state's interest in the use
of its chosen mode of allocating decisionmaking responsibilities,1 1 '
while stressing the strong federal interest in maintaining the federal
courts as an independent system for administering justice with its own
108 In Hanna, the Court also recognized the relevance of determining the impor-
tance to the state of implementing its rule, but it then limited the weight to be given
to that interest.
Erie and its progeny make clear that when a federal court sitting in a
diversity case is faced with a question of whether or not to apply state law, the
importance of a state rule is indeed relevant, but only in the context of ask-
ing whether application of the rule would make so important a difference to
the character or result of the litigation that failure to enforce it would un-
fairly discriminate against citizens of the forum State, or whether application
of the rule would have so important an effect upon the fortunes of one or
both of the litigants that failure to enforce it would be likely to cause a plain-
tiff to choose the federal court.
Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468 n.9.
See alsoJohn R. Leathers, Erie and Its Progeny as Choice of Law Cases, 11 HOUSTON
L. REV. 791, 802 (1974) (arguing that "Guaranty was in fact an interest analysis, well in
advance of its time").
109 See, e.g., Allan Ides, The Supreme Court and the Law To Be Applied in Diversity Cases:
A Critical Guide to the Development and Application of the Erie Doctrine and Related Problems,
163 F.R.D. 19, 86 (1995) ("My view would be that Byrd is no longer useful law.");
Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Bad for Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the Supreme
Court Is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence, 73 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 963, 986 (1998) ("Whatever the lower federal courts were doing, the Supreme
Court never returned to Byrd-style balancing .... This treatment left Byrd in a puz-
zling limbo as a case never overruled but studiously avoided .... ") (footnote
omitted).
110 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
111 Justice Brennan's opinion stated that the South Carolina decisions "furnish no
reason for selecting the judge rather than the jury to decide this single affirmative
defense," Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536, (1958), in-
stead attributing this choice to practical considerations and custom.
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set of uniform rules,112 the Court easily justified the use of the federal
practice of having the issue in question decided by a jury." 3
In contrast, Gasperini concluded that a federal district court sit-
ting in New York should apply the state's more restrictive standard for
trial court review of a jury's verdict, rather than the more deferential
federal standard. The Supreme Court found that the "state and fed-
eral interests can be accommodated" by adjusting the federal practice
to yield to "New York's dominant interest.""14 However, the Court
then determined that, with respect to the standard for appellate review
of the trial court's decision, the federal practice of reviewing only for
"abuse of discretion," rather than the more demanding state standard,
would control. Failure to follow the federal rule not only might raise
Seventh Amendment issues, but also might interfere unduly with fed-
eral interests." 5
As described more fully below, these two cases suffer from incon-
sistency both in identifying the relevant state and federal interests and
in providing a mechanism for determining which should
predominate. However, I believe that an informed weighing of these
potentially competing interests, drawing in part on experience in the
horizontal choice of law setting in the use of this approach, can pro-
duce sounder and more consistent resolutions of conflicts in the verti-
cal setting.
112 Among the reasons for maintaining the federal courts' independence are
achieving uniformity in the rules and standards applied throughout the system and
the consequent increased ease in administering those rules. Although it is true that
the attempt to obtain uniformity among the states with respect to substantive law may
have been a motivation forJustice Story in Swift, Erie nonetheless rejected this goal as
inadequate justification for failing to follow state law, since the federal courts did not
have the power to create a federal rule. By contrast, this desire to achieve uniformity
in the setting of procedural rules should properly be treated as within the powers of
the federal courts.
113 See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 537-38 ("The federal system is an independent system for
administering justice to litigants .... An essential characteristic of that system is the
manner in which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes trial functions between
judge and jury .... It cannot be gainsaid that there is a strong federal policy against
allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal courts."); Gas-
perini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 432 (1996) (describing Byrd as
involving "countervailing federal interests").
114 Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 437. ("New York's dominant interest can be respected,
without disrupting the federal system, once it is recognized that the federal district
court is capable of performing the checking function, i.e., that court can apply the
State's 'deviates materially' standard in line with New York case law ... .
115 See infra note 214.
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II. INSIGHTS FROM CoNFIrcrs ANALYsis
There are elements from the conflicts field that touch on all of
the steps used to decide whether to apply federal or state law in a
diversity case. This Article will next consider the extent to which this
learning may be helpful in illuminating the inquiries that courts must
make in applying the Erie doctrine.
A. Is There a Clash?
As discussed above, 116 there must be a "clash" between federal
and state law to raise Erie issues. If the federal law does not "occupy"
the area that is covered by state law, then by default, only the latter
can apply and further analysis would be unnecessary. Similarly, by
definition, choice of law problems will not arise unless there is a con-
flict between the laws of two or more states or countries. However, in
contrast to the extensive, but inconsistent, consideration of this ques-
tion from the Erie perspective, there is far less discussion of this ques-
tion in the horizontal setting.
With respect to potential differences in the substantive laws of
two different states, there of course may be situations in which one
state will not have decided a particular question or where the law is
unclear or potentially outmoded. But for the most part, the laws of
each of the states regarding questions of contracts, torts, property
ownership, family law, and so forth are relatively formed and compre-
hensive. And, these rules are then intended to be plenary, in the
sense of covering conduct that falls within the particular subject area
and that comes within the regulatory power of the state. Therefore,
although a state may ultimately decline to apply its law out of defer-
ence to another jurisdiction, the situation typically is not one in which
the forum state does not have a body of potentially applicable legal
rules.
Nonetheless, a different aspect of conflicts analysis-the weighing
of the interests of different jurisdictions-may play a helpful role in
the preliminary determination of whether there is a collision between
state and federal law. As discussed more extensively below, 117 one im-
portant methodology used in modern conflicts analysis is the identifi-
cation of situations in which only one of two jurisdictions genuinely
has an interest in the application of its legal rule to a dispute-the so-
called "false conflict." In those cases, it follows that the forum should
apply the law of the only interested state. Furthermore, the forum
116 See supra notes 36-55 and accompanying text.
117 See infra notes 193-97 and accompanying text.
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state is encouraged to evince a willingness to downplay its own inter-
ests or to give greater respect to the interest of the other jurisdiction,
to increase the likelihood that a conflict will in fact turn out to be
"false." A similar approach can be used in the Erie setting to reduce
the frequency of federal vs. state law clashes.
As noted, the Supreme Court has employed conflicting rules of
construction in its determination of whether there is a clash: that fed-
eral statutes and the Federal Rules should not be given unnecessarily
narrow interpretations, but also that unnecessary conflicts between
state and federal law should be avoided. One way of attempting to
reconcile Walker,1" 8 Burlington Northern,1 9 and Stewart20 would be to
look at the comparative strengths of the federal and state interests in
those cases. In Walker, Oklahoma had a strong interest in applying its
statute of limitations to determine which claims were "stale," while
there was little or no federal interest in extending such claims. By
contrast, in Burlington Northern, there was a comparatively strong fed-
eral interest in deciding whether to permit or deter appeals, while
Alabama had little interest in rules that would reduce the docket of
the federal appellate courts. In Stewart, there also were strong federal
interests in locating an action in one district court rather than an-
other;' 2' however, this decision is subject to criticism because, as
noted above, 22 the Court paid no attention to the reasons that Ala-
bama might have had for the adoption of its no-forum non con-
veniens dismissal rule. 23 It is true that Stewart and Hanna indicate
that the existence of a valid federal statute or Rule will always displace
a conflicting state procedural rule. However, more frequent resort to
the approach used in Walker-of finding a "false conflict"-indicates
that such a preliminary step may serve as a means of introducing addi-
tional respect for state interests and policies.124
118 See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
119 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
120 See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
121 See infra notes 219 & 223-28 and accompanying text.
122 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
123 In the taxonomy used in the next portion of this Article, Stewart reduced what
was in fact a "true conflict" into a "false conflict."
124 See Freer, supra note 51, at 1642-44 (arguing that Gasperini may have replaced
the search for "plain meaning" of a federal rule, with the "heightened sensitivity to
potential impact on state policy," to determine existence of "clash").
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B. Applying Conflicts Methodologies to Four Approaches Used Under Erie
to Resolve Clashes
The discussion in the previous Section of this Article125 indicates
that after Stewart and Hanna, federal statutory law of a procedural na-
ture or one of the Federal Rules almost certainly will control in the
face of inconsistent and conflicting state law. Instead, today it is fairly
clear that thorny vertical choice of law issues will arise only if the fed-
eral rule is the product ofjudge-made law. I now turn to the benefit
that conflicts analysis might give to resolving these questions.
1. Substantive-Procedural
Erie's distinction between substantive and procedural rules finds
analogies in traditional choice of law doctrine. The normal practice is
that even when a state decides to apply the substantive law of another
state to a dispute, it will use its own rules of procedure and evi-
dence.1 26 Indeed, the decision by a forum state to characterize an
issue as "procedural"1 27 may occasionally be used as an "escape de-
vice" to avoid having to apply the disfavored legal rule of another
state.128
125 See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
126 In a leading conflicts case, Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930),
which held that the Due Process Clause prevents a state from applying its substantive
law to a dispute with which it has limited or no contacts, the Court also stated: "[A]
state is not bound to provide remedies and procedure to suit the wishes of individual
litigants. It may prescribe the kind of remedies to be available in its courts and dictate
the practice and procedure to be followed in pursuing those remedies." Id. at 409.
See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 122 (1971) ("A court usually
applies its own local law rules prescribing how litigation shall be conducted even
when it applies the local law rules of another state to resolve other issues in the
case."); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 585 (1934) ("All matters of procedure
are governed by the law of the forum."); id. § 597 ("The law of the forum determines
the admissibility of a particular piece of evidence.").
127 The forum makes the determination, according to its own choice of law rules,
whether a given issue is one of substance or procedure. See RESTATEMENT OF CON-
FLICT OF LAWs § 584 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 7 (2)
(1971).
128 See Olmstead v. Anderson, 400 N.W.2d 292, 296-97 (Mich. 1987) ("[Under the
earlier territorial approach,] courts employed escape devices to avoid potentially
harsh results. The two main manipulative techniques were 'procedural characteriza-
tion' and the 'public policy' exception .... Procedural characterization involves
characterization of an issue as procedural rather than substantive, and then applying
forum law to the procedural issues. Courts, thus, were able to evade applying the law
of the state in which the wrong occurred.").
See, e.g., Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 529 (N.Y. 1961) (stat-
ing that the measure of damages in a tort action is a procedural or remedial question,
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Nonetheless, it is not clear that this distinction in the horizontal
setting will be particularly illuminating in making Erie determinations.
Certainly some of the motivations for either a federal or a state court's
use of its own rules of practice and evidence are the same, including
ease of application, uniformity, and the like. However, there is con-
siderable difficulty in defining "substantive" law. This is compounded
by the fact that the lines between substance and procedure are often
drawn in different places in different situations. 129 More importantly,
there are also significantly different reasons for drawing these lines.
A leading illustration of the difference in labeling that may occur
is the disparate treatment of statutes of limitations. In Guaranty Trust,
while declining to characterize a statute of limitations as either proce-
dural or substantive, 130 the Supreme Court nonetheless held that, in a
diversity action, federal courts must apply the state's statute of limita-
tions, since a failure to follow it would afford the plaintiff an opportu-
nity to continue litigating a claim that would be pronounced "dead on
arrival" in state court. 13 ' By contrast, in the choice of law field, in Sun
Oil Co. v. Wortman'32 the Supreme Court held that a state may apply its
own longer statute of limitations to a claim even if that state has so few
contacts with the dispute that it is forbidden, as a constitutional mat-
ter, from applying its own substantive law to the claim, and even if the
controlled by the law of forum); Grant v. McAuliffe, 264 P.2d 944, 947 (Ca. 1953)
(citing numerous other cases and averring that survivorship of action upon death of
tort victim was procedural); Mertz v. Mertz, 3 N.E.2d 597, 599-600 (N.Y. 1936) (find-
ing that immunity of husband for tort damage to wife concerns remedies and proce-
dures to be governed by law of forum state); RESTATEMENT OF CONFucr OF LAWs § 606
(1934) (stating that the statutory damage cap is procedural).
See also LEA BRILMAYER, CoNFLICT OF LAws 28 (2d ed. 1995) (describing the char-
acterization of issue as procedural or substantive as one "that probably most
threatened the REsTATEmENT goals of uniformity and predictability .... [anyjudge
wishing to apply local law might simply decide that the relevant legal issue was a pro-
cedural one"); ROBERT A- LEFLAR ET AL., AmERicAN CoNFLICTS LAW 261 (4th ed. 1986)
("[I] t is apparent that [in some cases] the characterization technique is being used to
achieve results that must be justified, if at all, by other real reasons. That other real
reasons may exist cannot be doubted. The valid questions are as to what. the real
reasons are, and why a cover-up device should be manipulated to conceal them.").
129 See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) ("The line between 'substance'
and 'procedure' shifts as the legal context changes.").
130 See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
By contrast, in Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980), discussed supra
notes 38-45 and accompanying text, the Court stated that the Oklahoma statute of
limitations "is a statement of a substantive decision by that State that actual service on,
and accordingly actual notice by, the defendant is an integral part of the several poli-
cies served by the statute of limitations." Id. at 751 (emphasis added).
131 Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 108-12 (1945).
132 486 U.S. 717 (1988).
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claim would be extinct in the state whose substantive law gave rise to
it.133 For these purposes, the statute of limitations was treated as pro-
cedural, and therefore the forum state had the power to determine its
length and scope.' 34
Wortman reiterated what has often been stated: that a rule, here
the statute of limitations, may be characterized differently in different
contexts. This difference, as explained by Justice Scalia, was best un-
derstood by focusing on the purpose for distinguishing between "sub-
stance" and "procedure."135 For Erie purposes, characterization was
undertaken to obtain substantially similar outcomes in state and fed-
eral court.13 6 By contrast, in the horizontal setting, the purpose was
not to advance uniformity, but rather to ensure respect for the author-
ity of a state to regulate domestic activities by restraining the potential
133 The rule at common law was that a forum state would apply its own statute of
limitations. See RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICr OF LAws § 604 (1934). As a further illus-
tration that horizontal choice of law issues are governed by considerations of comity
rather than command, it is noteworthy that this rule has been abrogated in the vast
majority of states by the enactment of borrowing statutes. See, e.g., UNIFORM CONFLirc
OF LAws-LIMITATIONS AcT § 2, 12 U.LA. 158 (1996). Forsaking the opportunity to
employ their own longer statutes of limitations, the states that have enacted these
borrowing statutes instead require the forum to look (with respect to a variety of
defined circumstances) to the law of another jurisdiction to determine the appropri-
ate length of time for initiating a lawsuit. See Cope v. Anderson, 331 U.S. 461, 466
(1947) (noting that the purpose of borrowing statutes was to require forum court to
bar suits "if the right to sue [a defendant] had already expired in another state where
the combination of circumstances giving rise to the right to sue had taken place").
See generally David Vernon, Statutes of Limitations in the Conflict of Laws: Borrowing Stat-
utes, 32 RocKy MTN. L. REV. 287 (1960).
134 See Sun Oi4 486 U.S. at 728. The Court observed:
There is no more reason to consider recharacterizing statutes of limita-
tion as substantive under the Full Faith and Credit Clause than there is to
consider recharacterizing a host of other matters [including placement of
burden of proof] generally treated as procedural under conflicts law, and
hence generally regarded as within the forum State's legislative jurisdiction."
Id.
135 See id at 726 ("Except at the extremes, the terms 'substance' and 'procedure'
precisely describe very little except a dichotomy, and what they mean in a particular
context is largely determined by the purposes for which the dichotomy is drawn.").
136 See id at 726-27 ("In the context of our Eriejurisprudence, that purpose is to
establish.., substantial uniformity of predictable outcome [s] between cases tried in a
federal court and cases tried in the courts of the State in which the federal court
sits.").
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exercise by other states of legislative power over disputes with which
they have minimal or no contacts and interest. 37
Another illustration of the differences in labeling is found in a
leading court of appeals case decided shortly after Erie: Sampson v.
ChannelL138 After an automobile accident in Maine, the plaintiff
brought an action in a federal district court in Massachusetts based on
the diversity of the parties' citizenship. At issue was whether to apply
Maine's rule regarding the burden of proof on contributory negli-
gence, which assigned it to the plaintiff, or Massachusetts's standard,
which made it an affirmative defense, with the burden of proof to be
borne by the defendant. The First Circuit first concluded that, for
Erie purposes, the burden of proof was "substantive" and that the fed-
eral court therefore had to follow state law;' 3 9 failure to do so would
have affected the outcome of the litigation. 40 Then, anticipating
Klaxon v. Stentor's'4' requirement that the federal court must use the
state's choice of law rules, the court of appeals held that the district
court should resolve the burden of proof question in the same way as
the Massachusetts court would have. 42 In this second step, the First
Circuit concluded that Massachusetts would have characterized the
burden of proof issue as "procedural" for choice of law purposes and
therefore would have applied forum law, rather than the law of the
place of the wrong.' 43
137 See id. at 727 ("The purpose of the substance-procedure dichotomy in the con-
text of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, by contrast, is not to establish uniformity but
to delimit spheres of state legislative competence.").
138 110 F.2d 754 (1st Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 310 U.S. 650 (1940).
139 The First Circuit relied in part, id. at 758, on Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308
U.S. 208 (1939), a very brief opinion concluding that in an action brought in a fed-
eral district court in Texas to remove a cloud on title to land in Texas, when the issue
of bona fide purchase for value without notice was raised, the court must apply the
Texas rule regarding burden of proof. See also Guaranty Trust v. York, 326 U.S. 99,
109 ("[W]e have held that in diversity cases the federal courts must follow the law of
the State as to burden of proof.") (citing Cities Service).
In stark contrast, as noted supra note 134 and accompanying text, in Sun Oil, 486
U.S. at 728, the Court indicated in dictum that for conflicts purposes, placement of
the burden of proof was procedural, and so was "within the forum State's legislative
jurisdiction."
140 See Sampson, 110 F.2d at 756 ("[T]he greater likelihood there is that litigation
would come out one way in the federal court and another way in the state court if the
federal court failed to apply a particular local rule, the stronger the urge would be to
classify the rule as not a mere matter of procedure but one of substantive law falling
within the mandate of the Tompkins case.").
141 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
142 See Sampson, 110 F.2d at 760-62.
143 See id. at 759.
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Sampson recognized that there are different concerns at stake in
the determination, in the vertical as opposed to the horizontal setting,
of whether an issue is procedural or substantive. For Erie purposes,
both to avoid a substantial difference in outcome between state and
federal courts and to maintain respect for the policyjudgments made
by the state's courts, congruence between the two rules is desirable.
This can be achieved in part by treating an issue as "substantive" when
its effect on the litigation is "substantial." On the other hand, with
respect to state vs. state choices, concern for ease of administration,
including ease of determining the applicable rule, and a desire to ad-
vance certain policy objectives, will counsel in favor of the forum's use
of its own law for a larger number of issues in the litigation. And
there is far less of a counterweight to this tendency because, in con-
trast to the Erie setting, there probably will be neither constitutional
nor statutory constraints on the state's characterization of marginal
issues as procedural.Y4
2. Outcome-Determination
The second approach-the "outcome-determination" test-prob-
ably holds out the least likelihood of benefiting from learning derived
from the choice of law field. In contrast to the requirements imposed
by Erie and Guaranty Trust on the federal courts, which are in great
measure the result of the Constitution and statutory provisions, state
courts simply do not feel any comparable imperative merely to pro-
vide an "alternate forum" to the litigants, but still to yield a substan-
tially similar result as in another state that has equal or greater
contacts with the dispute.
It is true that horizontal choice of law decisions are animated in
part by goals of uniformity and predictability of outcome, 145 and these
may result in the application of a similar rule-yielding a similar out-
come-in the forum state as in another jurisdiction. However, when
other values are present-including the forum's interests in some or
all of the parties and the events giving rise to the transaction or its
144 As noted supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text, in Sun Oil the Court held
that a state could apply its own longer statute of limitations to an action, even if it
lacked the necessary contacts with the dispute for its substantive law to apply. In dic-
tum, the court suggested that a state in that position could also apply its own rules
with respect to remedies available, placement of burden of proof, burden of produc-
tion, sufficiency of the evidence, and privileges.
145 See Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 591 (1953) ("The purpose of a conflict-
of-laws doctrine is to assure that a case will be treated in the same way under appropri-
ate law regardless of the fortuitous circumstances which often determine the fo-
rum."); see also supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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desire to achieve fairness for those parties, or its view of the "better
rule" to be applied-these other goals will often be subordinated. 146
In such situations, although the forum will recognize that the result it
reaches may well differ from that which would obtain in another juris-
diction, these other values wind up dictating that different outcome.
Therefore, while federal courts may find these shared values instruc-
tive in filling in some gaps, the differences are more likely to over-
whelm the similarities.
3. Twin Aims of Erie
Horizontal choice of law principles may prove of some limited
benefit in obtaining a better understanding of the "twin aims of
Erid'-discouragement of forum shopping and avoidance of the ineq-
uitable administration of the state's laws.
As discussed above with respect to "outcome-determination," it is
true that in making choice of law determinations, a state may wish to
promote uniformity and predictability of outcome and may be reluc-
tant to become a haven for parties seeking the benefit of its own, dif-
ferent legal rules with respect to a dispute with which the state has
minimal contacts and therefore has comparatively slight interests in
the resolution of the dispute.147 Similar considerations-of denying
146 For example, in Sexton v. Ryder Truck Renta4 Inc., 320 N.W.2d 843 (Mich. 1982),
in which Michigan rejected the lex loci delicti rule in favor of interest analysis, the court
stated:
The principle [sic] argument for following lex loci delicti has always
been that it would provide certainty and predictability...
The other argument in favor of lex loci delicti, avoidance of forum
shopping, is not a strong argument as against citizens of the forum state who
presumably have every reason of convenience and economy to be entitled to
service in their own state. To this, of course, can be added the fact that the
forum state generally has an interest in seeing that its injured citizens are
well-served and that its citizen defendants are afforded every protection that
such citizens would have in their own state. Additionally, where both the
plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of the forum state, the state where
the wrong took place will normally have no interest in the litigation.
The upshot of all of this is that there appears to be no real reason to
retain the rule of lex loci delicti, on the one hand, while, on the other hand,
there seems to be good reason and practical pressure in Michigan for the
forum to apply its own law.
Id. at 853-54 (plurality opinion) (Williams, J.).
147 See, e.g., Stuart v. American Cyanamid Co., 158 F.3d 622, 627 (2d Cir. 1998)
("[P]urpose of the borrowing statute-preventing forum shopping by plaintiffs seek-
ing the holy grail of the longer period-is best served by applying the period of the
foreign state"); Aboud v. Budget Rent A Car Corp., 29 F. Supp. 2d 178, 183 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) ("[A]pplication of [forum] law would create the appearance of favoritism to-
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the plaintiff the opportunity to engage in forum shopping in search of
the state with the most favorable legal rule-may motivate the dismis-
sal of an action on forum non conveniens grounds.1 48 And a state
may decline to apply its own law to a dispute touching it and another
jurisdiction because application of the latter's legal rule will yield a
ward the local litigant, whereas application of [the place of wrong's] law would not.
Favoritism encourages forum shopping, which interferes with the smooth operation
of the multi-state judicial system."); Portwood v. Ford Motor Co., 701 N.E.2d 1102,
1104 (Ill. 1998) ("[A] doption of crossjurisdictional class tolling in Illinois would en-
courage plaintiffs from across the country to bring suit here following dismissal of
their class actions in federal court. We refuse to expose the Illinois court system to
such forum shopping."); Olmstead v. Anderson, 400 N.W.2d 292, 303 (Mich. 1987)
("The concern surrounding forum shopping stems from the fear that a plaintiff will
be able to determine the outcome of a case simply by choosing the forum in which to
bring suit."); Paul v. National Life Ac., 352 S.E.2d 550, 556 n.14 (W. Va. 1986) (to
avoid creation of a rule that would be an "invitation to flagrant forum shopping,"
requiring that "[t]his State must have some connection with the controversy above
and beyond mere service of process [in state] before the rule we announce today will
be applied"); Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., Inc., 480 N.E.2d 679, 687 (N.Y. 1985)
("[B] ecause New York has no significant interest in applying its own law to this dis-
pute .... application of New Jersey law will enhance 'the smooth working of the
multistate system' by actually reducing the incentive for forum shopping and it will
provide certainty for the litigants.. . ."); Duke v. Housen, 589 P.2d 334, 344 (Wyo.
1979) (finding that use of borrowing statute to determine limitations period "not only
clears up any substantive procedural conflict problem, but eliminates as well the possi-
bility of the plaintiff shopping for a favorable forum in which to revive a dead claim").
In his famous five imaginary cases, which he used as a vehicle to articulate varying
approaches to resolving choice of law questions, Professor David Cavers put the fol-
lowing words in "Judge" Erwin Griswold's mouth:
[An appreciation of the existence and purpose of the conflict of
laws] . . . is made apparent when the question of forum shopping is
considered ....
... [W]e will not fulfill the objectives of the conflict of laws, unless we
can provide rules for cases under which the same cases will be decided the
same way no matter where the suit is brought, to the extent that this is possi-
ble within the limits of human frailty. We will not always be successful in
achieving uniformity, but we will surely have more success if we constantly
hold up uniformity of result as a major objective, and recognize that there
can be no true justice without it.
DAVID F. CAVERs, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS 22-23 (1965).
148 See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 250 (1981) ("[I]f conclusive or
substantial weight were given to the possibility of a change in law, the forum non
conveniens doctrine would become virtually useless.... [M] any plaintiffs are able to
choose from among several forums. Ordinarily, these plaintiffs will select that forum
whose choice of law rules are most advantageous.").
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"fairer" result. 49 Nonetheless, as just suggested, those values will yield
when paramount concerns for application of forum law exist-even if
that results in the plaintiff opting for that state as its forum solely to
get the benefit of those preferable rules. 5 0
Consider as an example the famous line of New York cases in
which the state, not having a guest statute, developed its interest analy-
sis by refusing to apply other jurisdictions' guest statutes to accidents
occurring in those places and involving New York domiciliaries as
plaintiffs.' 5 ' The New York courts could hardly have been unaware
that the plaintiffs undoubtedly had chosen to bring their actions in
their home state to avoid the application of a guest statute that would
have defeated their claims had they instead chosen to sue in the juris-
diction in which the accident took place. 5 2 But the importance of
149 This analysis may help to explain two New York Court of Appeals decisions, in
the transition period between the traditional, territorial approach and interest analy-
sis. See Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1961) (stating that because Illinois had
the most significant relationship with the parties and their contractual child support
agreement, its law should determine whether the plaintiffs rights should be governed
exclusively by the agreement); Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954) (holding
that English law should govern the terms of a separation agreement between an Eng-
lish couple that was signed in New York after the husband had moved to that state,
since England was the "center of gravity" of the dispute and English law would effectu-
ate the parties' intentions). In both Haag and Auten, the refusal to follow New York's
law seemed to result in a "fairer" outcome.
150 See QSP, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., No. 326873, 1998 WL 892997, at *19
(Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 8, 1998). The court noted:
Predictability and uniformity of result are important values in all areas
of the law. To the extent that they are attained in choice of law, forum
shopping will be discouraged. These values can, however, be purchased at
too great a price. In a rapidly developing area, such as choice of law, it is
often more important that good rules be developed than that predictability
and uniformity of result should be assured ....
Id. See also Tkaczevski v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 169, 174 (S.D.N.Y.
1998) (holding that in action by forum resident, application of forum law to accident
taking place in another state did "not encourage forum shopping").
151 See Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y. 1969); Macey v. Rozbicki, 221
N.E.2d 380 (N.Y. 1966); Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963). But see Dym
v. Gordon, 209 N.E.2d 100 (N.Y. 1965) (declining to apply New York rule to accident
in which New York domiciliary was injured in Colorado, where both parties had dwelt
in Colorado for extended period of time, host-guest relationship was formed in Colo-
rado, and accident involved third party).
152 In fact, in Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972), which involved an
action by a Canadian resident against a Canadian railroad and a New York resident
arising out of a car-train collision in Ontario, the NewYork Court of Appeals declined
to give the plaintiff the benefit of its own no-guest statute rule because
the failure to apply Ontario's [guest statute] law would 'impair' . . . 'the
smooth working of the multi-state system [and] produce great uncertainty
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protecting the resident-plaintiff counseled the New York court's
choice of the state's no-guest statute rule, even if that clearly resulted
in "forum shopping."153
Furthermore, there is a substantial difference in the nature of the
objection to horizontal versus vertical forum shopping. The right of a
plaintiff to choose to file suit in any of the several states in which per-
sonaljurisdiction can be obtained over the defendant, followed by the
possibility that different legal rules will prevail in those different states,
is essentially the product of our federal system, which contemplates
that each state remains free, subject only to constitutional constraints,
to shape its laws in a variety of ways. Indeed, the Supreme Court has
stated that federal courts sitting in diversity cases must defer to and
enforce these differences. 154 On the other hand, forum shopping in
the Erie context is objectionable because it clashes with the Guaranty
Trust vision of the purpose of diversity jurisdiction as affording merely
an alternative (and perhaps more neutral) forum, but not one
designed to give the parties a different set of legal rules. 155
This distinction is at the heart of the rule in Klaxon v. Stentor,15 6
which, as noted, requires a federal court hearing a diversity case to
apply the state court's conflict of law rules.
Any other ruling Would do violence to the principle of uniformity
within a state, upon which the Tompkins decision is based. Whatever
lack of uniformity this may produce between federal courts in differ-
ent states is attributable to our federal system, which leaves to a
state, within the limits permitted by the Constitution, the right to
pursue local policies diverging from those of its neighbors. 157
for litigants' by sanctioning forum shopping and thereby allowing a party to
select a forum which could give him a larger recovery than the court of his
domicile.
Id. at 458.
153 Id. at 457 ("[I] n Babcock v. Jackson... we were willing to sacrifice the certainty
provided by the old rule for the more just, fair and practical result that may best be
achieved by giving controlling effect to the law of the jurisdiction which has the great-
est concern with, or interest in, the specific issue raised in the litigation.").
154 See Ferens v. John Deere & Co., 494 U.S. 516, 527 (1989) ("Diversity jurisdic-
tion did not eliminate these forum shopping opportunities; instead, under Erie, the
federal courts had to replicate them.").
155 See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111-12 (1945) ("Diversityjurisdic-
tion is founded on assurance to non-resident litigants of courts free from susceptibil-
ity to potential local bias.... And so Congress afforded out-of-State litigants another
tribunal, not another body of law.").
156 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941). The Court also
applied this rule in the companion case to Klaxon-Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498,
503-04 (1941).
157 Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
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The recognition that the plaintiff's choice of forum will be
animated in large measure by the legal rules to be applied in that state
to her dispute is also reflected in the line of cases requiring, as a con-
stitutional matter, that the forum have at least some minimal contacts
with the parties and the litigation before it may apply its law.' 58 The
plaintiff cannot simply look for that state, of the fifty states, which has
the most favorable set of rules and then bring the action there.15 9
However, these cases implicitly accept the fact that once these consti-
tutional minima are met, 60 the plaintiff will be free to choose to en-
gage in horizontal forum shopping in search of a state which will, in
turn, be able to apply freely its favorable rules to the dispute.
This acceptance of the plaintiff's right to engage in horizontal fo-
rum shopping is further reflected in the rule that, when a lawsuit is
transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) from one federal district
court to another, the transferee court must apply the law of the trans-
feror forum, i.e., the law that would have been applied in the court
originally selected by the plaintiff.' 6 ' The Supreme Court asserted
that to do otherwise would allow the defendant's opportunity to seek
transfer to "create or multiply opportunities for forum shopping.' 62
158 See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981) ("[F]or a State's
substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must
have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state inter-
ests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair."); see also
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S.
397 (1930).
159 Of course, the plaintiff's choice is constrained by limits on personal jurisdic-
tion. As the Supreme Court stated in the oft-quoted passage from International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), "in order to subject a defendant to ajudgment
in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he [must] have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not
offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Id at 316 (citation
omitted).
160 It is noteworthy that the quantum of contacts that a state must have with a
dispute, in order to be permitted to apply its law to a dispute, is lower than the mini-
mum contacts that the defendant must have with the forum state to allow it to exer-
cise specific personal jurisdiction. See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 215
(1977) ("[W]e have rejected the argument that if a State's law can properly be ap-
plied to a dispute, its courts necessarily have jurisdiction over the parties to that
dispute.").
161 See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
162 Ferens v.John Deere & Co., 494 U.S. 516, 523 (1990) (explaining rationale for
Van Dusen holding). See also id. at 527 ("An opportunity for forum shopping exists
whenever a party has a choice of forums that will apply different laws .... [E]ven
without § 1404(a), a plaintiff already has the option of shopping for a forum with the
most favorable law.").
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This difference in attitude towards horizontal and vertical forum
shopping is perhaps best illustrated by Ferens v. John Deere & Co. 163
The plaintiff, a Pennsylvania citizen, lost his right hand in an accident
that occurred in Pennsylvania when it became caught in farm machin-
ery manufactured by Deere. After the statute of limitations for his tort
claim had run in Pennsylvania, Ferens brought suit in a federal court
in Mississippi, 16 4 which had a longer statute of limitations.1 65 Ferens
then made a motion to have the action transferred, pursuant to
§ 1404(a), to the district court in Pennsylvania. Extending the rule
first articulated in Van Dusen v. Barrack166-which had held that in
actions transferred under § 1404(a) pursuant to a motion made by
the defendant, the transferee court should apply the law of the trans-
feror forum-the Ferens Court, in an opinion written by Justice Ken-
nedy, held that a similar result should follow after a motion by the
plaintiff, so that the federal court in Pennsylvania would apply Missis-
sippi's statute of limitations.
In dissent, Justice Scalia argued that Erie and Klaxon stood for two
policies: uniformity of outcome of litigation conducted within a state
and the avoidance of forum shopping. He asserted that these con-
cerns ought not be diminished when the case was heard in a federal
court located in a state, such as Pennsylvania, not because it was filed
In contrast to this limitation on the ability of the defendant to engage in forum
shopping pursuant to a § 1404(a) motion, in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235
(1981), the Supreme Court held that the fact that a defendant might indeed be
animated by such considerations in making a motion to dismiss an action on forum
non conveniens grounds-thus requiring the plaintiff to recommence the lawsuit in
another forum whose law was less favorable to it-would not be a bar to the grant of
that motion. The Court observed:
[T]his possibility [of reverse forum shopping] ordinarily should not
enter into a trial court's analysis of the private interests. If the defendant is
able to overcome the presumption in favor of plaintiff by showing that trial
in the chosen forum would be unnecessarily burdensome, dismissal is appro-
priate-regardless of the fact that defendant may also be motivated by a de-
sire to obtain a more favorable forum.
Id. at 252 n.19.
163 494 U.S. 516 (1990).
164 Personal jurisdiction and venue were not problems, since Deere did a suffi-
cient amount of unrelated business in Mississippi.
165 Under the rule of Klaxon Co. v. StentorElec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), the
district court followed Mississippi's choice of law rules; the state courts, in turn, would
have applied the Mississippi, rather than the Pennsylvania, statute of limitations.
166 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
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there initially, but because of a § 1404(a) transfer pursuant to a mo-
tion made by the plaintiff. 67
Rejecting that view, the majority recognized that the type of fo-
rum shopping that led to the preservation of the lawsuit, which under
Pennsylvania law would have been extinguished, was horizontaL This
outcome was the product of Ferens's right to sue in Mississippi (be-
cause its courts had general personal jurisdiction over the defendant)
and of Mississippi's recognized right to apply its own longer statute of
limitations to the lawsuit. Erie simply did not deal with this choice and
could not affect it.
On the other hand, depriving the plaintiff of the benefit of Mis-
sissippi's advantageous statute of limitations, subsequent to the
§ 1404(a) transfer, would have raised real Erie concerns, since that re-
sult would occur only when diversity opened the federal courts as an
alternative forum. The dissent had argued that Erie's goal of prevent-
ing forum shopping would be undermined by allowing Ferens,
through the device of a § 1404(a) transfer, to be able to litigate a still-
live claim in the federal court in Pennsylvania and thus obtain a result
that he could not have achieved had he sued originally in a Penn-
sylvania state court. 68
However, the majority focused instead on the initially required
vertical congruence between the rule to be applied in the federal and
state courts in Mississippi and decided that it should not be upset by
the subsequent transfer authorized by a federal statute. That statute
had already been construed in Van Dusen 169 so as not to deprive par-
ties in the federal courts of the right to opt for a particular state's law,
an advantage they could have opted for in the absence of diversity.' 70
Justice Kennedy concluded that application of Pennsylvania's statute
of limitations here would have undermined the policies underlying
Erie, since the initiation of a transfer under § 1404(a) would also have
167 Justice Scalia also argued that contrary to the majority's approach, which
viewed the case as one that turned on an interpretation of § 1404(a), "the case in-
volves an interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act." Ferens, 494 U.S. at 539 (Scalia,
J., dissenting). However, notwithstanding the Justice's preference for reliance on tex-
tual sources for deciding cases, this approach still left unanswered the key issue: By
requiring that the federal court regard "the laws of the several states" as rules of deci-
sion, the Act itself does not delineate whether, in a § 1404(a) situation, the trans-
feror's or the transferee's state rule is the referenced "law."
168 See id at 535 ("The plaintiffs were seeking to achieve exactly what Kaxon was
designed to prevent: the use of a Pennsylvania federal court instead of a Pennsylvania
state court in order to obtain application of a different substantive law.") (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
169 See supra notes 161-62 and accompanying text.
170 See Ferens, 494 U.S. at 523.
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changed the state law that controlled this diversity case. 171 Further-
more, the fact that the plaintiff had engaged in horizontal forum shop-
ping to achieve this result was not fatal.
As already noted, in Stewart v. Ricoh, the Court held that
§ 1404(a), as a validly enacted federal procedural statute, prevails de-
spite potential Erie considerations. I have already criticized Stewart's
subordination of Erie principles because of its irrebuttable presump-
tion of the primacy of such a statute and because of the expansive
reading it gave to § 1404(a) to find it controlling.1 72 Nonetheless, Fer-
ens makes clear that the policies that animate the Erie doctrine are
simply inapplicable with respect to any attempt to reduce forum shop-
ping in the state vs. state setting. Erie instead requires that once a law-
suit is properly brought in a federal court in any state, that court will
follow (with all necessary qualifications) the law that would have been
applied in that state's courts, so as not to give either party an inappro-
priate incentive to opt for state vs. federal court.
The parallel between horizontal choice of law considerations and
the second aim of the Erie doctrine, avoiding interference with a
state's administration of its laws, would appear to be strongest under
the somewhat discredited traditional or territorial approach to choice
of law, as embodied in the First Restatement. 173 That methodology is
predicated in part on the "vested rights" theory,174 under which the
occurrence of certain events gives rise to rights (and obligations) that
then exist even prior to their recognition or declaration by a court.' 75
Applying this theory, the creation of such a right, as a consequence of
a particular event occurring in a state-such as the acceptance of a
171 See id. at 526 ("[Section] 1404(a) [is] a housekeeping measure that should not
alter the state law governing a case under Erie.").
172 See supra notes 71-73 & 121-23 and accompanying text.
173 RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1934).
174 "The earlier Restatement treated choice of law in torts and contracts by articu-
lating a closed set of rules derived from vested-rights analysis." RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, Introduction (1971).
175 A leading proponent of the vested rights theory was Professor Joseph Beale of
Harvard Law School, who was Reporter for the First Restatement. See JOSEPH H.
BLE, SELEcTIONS FROM A TREATIsE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 4-5 (1935) ("When
a right has been created by law, this right itself becomes a fact. ... If no law having
power to do so has changed a right, the existing right should everywhere be recognized,
since to do so is merely to recognize the existence of a fact.") (emphasis added);
JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CoNFLIar OF LAWS 62 (1935) ("[Liegal protec-
tion of interests of property and person results in the creation of legal rights in per-
sons or personal relations and in things.... If my interest in my house is protected by
law it becomes my established property."); see also Perry Dane, Vested Rights, "Vested-
ness," and Choice of Law, 96 YALE LJ. 1191 (1987).
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contract offer or harm to a tort victim-results in rights and obliga-
tions that ought to be honored not only in that state, but extraterrito-
rially as well.' 7 6
In fact, however, the First Restatement approach has been much-
criticized,'77 as reflected in large measure by the significantly different
approaches of the Second Restatement'7 8 and other post-World War
II methodologies; these have supplanted the vested rights theory in
the overwhelming majority of states.' 7 9
However, an invocation of the vested rights theory might have
some utility for Erie analysis. Under that approach, the failure of the
forum to recognize the same elements and defenses in a claim as the
state in which the claim arose would affect the very essence of the
parties' rights and obligations. By analogy, in a diversity case, the fail-
ure of a federal court to uphold the elements and defenses in a claim
would interfere with the definition given to the rights and duties re-
garding that claim by the state that created the claim.
176 An early description of the creation of a claim by virtue of the law of the place
in which the tortious conduct and injury occurred is found in Cuba Railroad Co. v.
Crosby, 222 U.S. 473 (1912). Justice Holmes advised:
[W]hen an action is brought upon a cause arising outside of the juris-
diction it always should be bome in mind that the duty of the court is not to
administer its notion of justice but to enforce an obligation that has been
created by a different law.... The law of the forum is material only as setting
a limit of policy beyond which such obligations will not be enforced there.
With very rare exceptions the liabilities of parties to each other are fixed by
the law of the territorial jurisdiction within which the wrong is done and the
parties are at the time of doing it.
Id. at 478.
See also Brainerd Currie, On the Displacement of the Law of the Forum, 58 COLUM. L.
REV. 964, 1003-04 (1958) ("According to the vested-rights theory, the choice of law
rule is an inexorable command to apply the foreign law or none.").
177 See, e.g., O'Connor v. O'Connor, 519 A.2d 13, 17 (Conn. 1986) ("The vested
rights theory of choice of law is an anachronism in modem jurisprudence. Its under-
lying premise [is] that the legislative jurisdiction of the place where a right 'vests'
must be recognized in every other jurisdiction .... ."); see also BRmLMAYER, supra note
128, at 25-46 (summarizing criticisms of the Bealian approach).
178 See REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CoNrmcr OF LAws, Intro. Note to § 7 (1971)
("The vested rights approach of the original Restatement has been rejected in the
present Chapter [dealing with wrongs].").
179 In the face of this "revolution," it should be stressed that a number ofjurisdic-
tions adhere to the territorial approach. Professor Symeon Symeonides, who
prepares a very helpful annual survey of choice of law doctrine, indicates that as of
1997, eleven states follow the traditional approach with respect to torts conflicts, and
an overlapping group of ten states follow that approach for contracts conflicts. See
Symeon Symeonides, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1997, 46 AM. J. COMP. L.
233, 266 (1998) (table).
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However, there are several problems with this analogy. First, at
the horizontal level, the extent of enforcement of any "vested right"
would be based primarily on recognition of the interests of the parties
in the claim and in any defenses; it is their rights and obligations that
"vested" on the occurrence of the choice of law triggering event. By
contrast, when applying this second "aim" of Erie, the federal court's
principal obligation is to respect the interests of the jurisdiction that
gave rise to the claim.' 80 Nonetheless, the proposition that certain
elements of a claim may be transcendent, regardless of the forum in
which that claim is tried, would help illuminate this second branch of
the Erie policy.
Second, and more significantly, even to the extent that the vested
rights theory survives its multiple criticisms, its philosophical under-
pinnings are fundamentally inconsistent with Erie. By adopting the
implications of Justice Holmes's famous observation that the "com-
mon law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky"' 18 and by con-
cluding that judge-made rules are equally "law," Justice Brandeis's
opinion squarely rejected any suggestion that a particular kind of
claim could exist in the abstract, even prior to ajudicial declaration of
rights under those circumstances.
The more modern choice of law methodologies also embody
some aspects of this concern for other states' administration of their
laws. Thus, "interest analysis," discussed below,182 is based in large
measure on respect for, and potential deference to, the interests that
another state has in the parties and the dispute and thus in seeing that
its laws are applied to that dispute. As the next Section of this Article
suggests, in an Erie context, the federal courts' recognition that the
interests of the state predominate, or even more powerfully, that the
interest of the federal court in applying federal law is insignificant,
should result in the application of state law in the majority of cases.
That outcome would be consistent with the Erie goal of avoiding inter-
ference with the state's administration of its laws.
180 See BRILMAYER, supra note 128, at 41 ("[T]he modem school of governmental
interest analysis... [employs] a commitment to the recognition of state policy inter-
ests (as opposed to the recognition of private vested rights) . . ").
181 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Erie quoted at length from Justice Holmes's similar statements in Kuhn v. Fairmont
Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370-72 (1910) (Holmes, J., dissenting). See Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
182 See infra notes 193-208 and accompanying text.
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4. Balancing Federal and State Interests
In undertaking an Erie analysis, consideration of the interests of
the state and the federal courts presents the most tantalizing potential
for importation of approaches used in the choice of law field.'83 Con-
flicts law has seen a revolution in the past half century. Traditional
choice of law rules, reflected in the First Restatement, are essentially
territorial. Under this methodology, the court looks to an identifying
element of the claim-for example, the place of the last event neces-
sary to make the defendant liable for an alleged tort, 84 the place
where the contract was accepted, 185 the place where the parties were
married, 8 6 the state in which the corporation was incorporated, 87
and so forth-and then applies that state's law to the dispute, theoret-
ically irrespective of the content of the conflicting legal rules or its
effect on the outcome of the litigation. In other words, this approach
searches first for a jurisdiction whose law will apply and then obtains
the legal rule therefrom.
Since the 1950s, a number of alternative approaches have been
suggested. 188 Forsaking the territorial approach, the majority of states
have adopted some variety of these alternatives. While these newer
methodologies differ, they all share one significant contrast to the
First Restatement approach: they bring an identification (and occa-
sional balancing) of the policies or goals that would be advanced by
the conflicting legal rules into the forefront of the choice of law
analysis.
Employing these more modem approaches, some states now look
to the law of the jurisdiction with the "most significant relationship"
with the transaction and the parties; 89 others look to the law of the
183 Professor Weinberg has undertaken an analogous inquiry in Louise Weinberg,
The Federal-State Conflict of Laws: "Actual" Conflicts, 70 TEx. L. REV. 1743 (1992), in
which she asserts that interest analysis may be useful in harmonizing cases which have
applied such doctrines as preemption and federal supremacy to clashes between na-
tional and local substantive policies.
184 See RESTATEMENT OF CoNF.mur OF LAws §§ 377-90 (1934).
185 See id. §§ 311-72.
186 See id. §§ 121-36.
187 See id. §§ 152-202.
188 In his dissent in Ferens, Justice Scalia noted that Professor Robert Leflar had
identified "10 separate theories of choice of law that are applied, individually or in
various combinations, by the 50 States." Ferens v. John Deere & Co., 494 U.S. 516,
538 n.2 (1990) (ScaliaJ., dissenting). Undoubtedly numerous other approaches have
been advocated unsuccessfully.
189 This is the general principle used in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFucr
OF LAWS (1971). See id. § 145(1) (torts), § 188(1) (contracts), § 222 (property).
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jurisdiction with the preponderance of contacts;190 some states at-
tempt to determine which jurisdiction would be most aggrieved or
most seriously impacted if its rule were not applied;1 9 ' yet other states
apply the "better rule" to the situation, which, not surprisingly, is al-
most always forum law.19 2 Most importantly for this Article, many
states now seek to identify the interests that the several jurisdictions
would have in seeing their rule of law applied to the dispute, and ana-
lyze and then sometimes weigh these interests in opting for the appro-
priate legal standard.
A complete description of interest analysis not only is beyond the
scope of this Article; in many respects it is impossible. The seeds of
this approach are found in a series of articles written by Professor
Brainerd Currie in the 1950s and '60s. 193 Since then, many other aca-
demics have criticized, defended, modified, and refined interest anal-
ysis, so that it hardly bears the hallmark of a unified doctrine.19 4 The
treatment that interest analysis has received in the courts has been
equally divergent. Given the primarily common law nature of choice
of law rules, it is not surprising that different states have used different
parts of this methodology; and, even within a single state, there have
been variations, not only at different times, but also for different types
190 This is sometimes referred to as the "center-of-gravity" approach. See, e.g.,
Haag v. Barnes, 175 N.E.2d 441, 443 (N.Y. 1961); Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101
(N.Y. 1954).
191 This doctrine is sometimes referred to as "comparative impairment." See infra
note 205 and accompanying text.
192 See, e.g., Milkovich v. Saari, 203 N.W.2d 408 (Minn. 1973) (adopting sugges-
tions in Robert A. Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 267 (1966), and proposing application of better rule of law as one of five consid-
erations); see also Wallis v. Mrs. Smith's Pie Co., 550 S.W.2d 453, 456 (Ark. 1977);
Clark v. Clark, 222 A.2d 205, 208-09 (N.H. 1966); Albert A. Ehrenzweig, "False Con-
flicts" and the "Better Rule'" Threat and Promise in Multistate Tort Laws, 53 VA. L. REV. 847
(1967). Clearly, this approach has little or no application in an Erie setting.
193 See BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED EssAYs ON THE CoNFLICr OF LAWS (1963) (col-
lecting articles).
194 The secondary literature on interest analysis is voluminous. See, e.g., John Hart
Ely, Choice of Law and the State's Interest in Protecting Its Own, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 173
(1981); Herma Hill Kay, Use of Comparative Impairment To Resolve True Conflicts: An
Evaluation of the California Experience, 68 CAL. L. REV. 577 (1980); Harold L. Korn, The
Choice of Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 772 (1983); Larry Kramer, Re-
thinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1990); William M. Richman, Diagram-
ming Conflicts: A Graphic Understanding of Interest Analysis, 43 OHIO ST. LJ. 317 (1982);
Robert A. Sedler, Interest Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response
to the "New Critics, "34 MERCER L. REV. 593 (1983); RussellJ. Weintraub, Interest Analysis
in the Conflict of Laws as an Application of Sound Legal Reasoning, 35 MERCER L. REV. 629
(1984); see also Stewart E. Sterk, The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U.
PA. L. REV. 949 (1994).
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of cases. Thus, although I know that I run the risk of being charged
with gross oversimplification of this complex area, I offer here a brief
outline of the key aspects of interest analysis in the choice of law con-
text; hopefully this will be sufficient to provide a predicate for its pos-
sible application in the Erie setting.
States do not have interests merely in the abstract, either in cer-
tain conduct or in certain parties. Instead, these interests are reflec-
tive of the policies giving rise to and embodied in the states' legal
rules. Therefore, as an initial step, after determining that there is a
difference between the legal rules that two (or more) states would
apply to the issue in question, the court must attempt to identify the
goals or policies that the conflicting rules seek to further. 95 This in-
quiry may involve the examination of a combination of legislative his-
tory, judicial opinions, secondary literature, and other sources.' 96
The court must then attempt to identify the several states' inter-
ests in having their rules applied to the dispute and the extent to
which these interests would be affected if a different rule were ap-
plied. These interests may arise out of a number of contacts or affilia-
tions of the competing states: the accident took place in the state; the
property in dispute is located in the state; the will was executed in the
state; the defendant is incorporated in or is doing business in the
state; one or more of the parties reside in the state or is employed
195 By focusing on the importance of evaluating a clash in light of the "twin aims"
of Erie, Hanna, which was the next major case after Byrd, suggests a lesser role for
assessment of the state's interest. But, while requiring that the determination of the
strength of a state's policies must be done in context, Hanna nonetheless recognizes
the importance of those interests:
Erie and its progeny make clear that when a federal court sitting in a
diversity case is faced with a question of whether or not to apply state law, the
importance of a state rule is indeed relevant, but only in the context of ask-
ing whether application of the rule would make so important a difference to
the character or result of the litigation that failure to enforce it would un-
fairly discriminate against citizens of the forum State, or whether application
of the rule would have so important an effect upon the fortunes of one or
both of the litigants that failure to enforce it would likely cause a plaintiff to
choose the federal court.
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 n.9 (1965).
196 Professor Gurrie described this process as follows:
When it is suggested that the law of a foreign state should furnish the
rule of decision, the [forum] court should, first of all, determine the govern-
mental policy expressed in the law of the forum .... This process is essen-
tially the familiar one of construction or interpretation ....
If necessary, the court should similarly determine the policy expressed
by the foreign law ....
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there; and so on. These interests typically will reflect a combination
of objectives: deterring, promoting, or regulating certain kinds of con-
duct within the state (for example, enhancing safety on the highways,
facilitating transfer of interests in property, promoting commercial
transactions, and so forth); protecting or affording compensation to
certain groups of persons (including domiciliaries, corporations, wo-
men, and infants); and imposing duties or burdens on other
persons.' 97
The court will next determine whether the different interests of
the states with these contacts or affiliations present a "false conflict," a
"true conflict," or fall into some other category. A "false conflict," as
the name implies, arises when analysis of the putative interests of one
of the concerned states reveals that its policies would not in fact be
implicated by the application of the legal rule of another jurisdic-
tion.198 In these situations, the forum is instructed to follow the rule
of the only state with a true interest in the outcome of the dispute. 199
One possible route in this analysis, with important implications
for vertical choice of law situations, 200 is that the court may downplay
the importance of one state's (usually the forum's) interests, thereby
converting a seemingly "true conflict" into a "false conflict."'20 ' In
fact, this willingness to minimize the interests of one's own state is not
197 CURRIE, supra note 193, at 183-84.
The identification of "interests" is one of the most difficult, and problematic,
aspects of interest analysis. Since a state arguably has an "interest" both in regulating
conduct taking place within its borders and in protecting and regulating its domicil-
iaries (whether as plaintiff or defendant), the location of relevant events in the state
and the domicile of the parties can often control the presence or absence of "inter-
ests." While further discussion of this point in the horizontal setting is beyond the
scope of this Article, it suggests the related difficulty of identifying federal and state
interests in the context of an Erie analysis.
198 See, e.g., Hurtado v. Superior Court, 360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1974) (stating that be-
cause Mexico had no interest in applying its limitation of damages rule in wrongful
death action between Mexican plaintiff and California defendant, California, as both
forum state and jurisdiction with interest in deterring conduct of its domiciliaries,
properly applied its own law); Bernkrant v. Fowler, 522 P.2d 666 (Cal. 1961) (noting
that because forum had no interest in applying its own law to dispute, it applied the
law of other state).
199 See Brainerd Currie, Comments on Babcock v. Jackson, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 1233,
1242 (1963) ("If the court finds that one state has an interest in the application of its
policy in the circumstances of the case and the other has none, it should apply the law
of the only interested state.").
200 See infra notes 216 & 247 and accompanying text.
201 See, e.g., Schultz v. Boy Scouts of Am., 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1985); Bernkrant v.
Fowler, 360 P.2d 906 (Cal. 1961); People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 311 P.2d 480
(Cal. 1957).
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dissimilar from the methodology described above, 202 which can be
used to find an absence of a clash between state law and a federal rule.
On the other hand, a "true conflict" will exist if two (or more)
jurisdictions have a significant interest in the application of their rule
to the litigation or in its outcome. A number of alternatives have been
offered for resolving these situations. Professor Currie suggested that
the result was simple-apply the law of the forum state.203 Other
courts and academics suggest that a balancing or weighing is appro-
priate, with the court applying the law of the jurisdiction with the
strongest interest.20 4 A twist on this approach, sometimes called "com-
parative impairment," suggests that the court should apply the law of
the state whose interests would be most impaired if its rule were not
followed.20 5 Other courts may seek to apply the "better rule" or the
one that most advances a fair and just outcome.20 6
Finally, there is a third situation-the so-called unprovided-for
case-in which the analysis reveals that neither state has a true or sub-
stantial interest in the outcome of the litigation. Here, a court might
either apply its own law207 or may seek to identify a different interest
(e.g., compensation of victims) common to both jurisdictions.208
However, it is doubtful that this category will have implications for the
202 See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying text.
203 Professor Currie suggested that the forum should see if a "more moderate and
restrained interpretation of [its] policy or interest... may avoid conflict." Currie,
supra note 199, at 1242. However, "[i]f upon reconsideration, the court finds that a
conflict between the legitimate interests of the two states is unavoidable, it should
apply the law of the forum." Id. at 1242-43. He asserted dogmatically that "[f] or the
real problems, in which the forum's interests are at stake, there can be no judicial
solution except application of the law of the forum." Id. at 1242.
204 See Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964) (deciding, after weighing
interests of two states and finding both interests to be substantial, that forum's public
policy dictated application of forum law).
205 See S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense v. Boeing Co., 641 F.2d 746,
749 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Where significant interests conflict, the court must assess the
'comparative impairment' of each state's policies .... The law applied will be that of
the state whose policies would suffer the most were a different state's law applied.")
(describing California's approach and citing other cases); see Application Group, Inc.
v. Hunter Group, Inc., 61 Cal. App. 4th 881, 896 (1998) (same); Sommer v. Gabor, 40
Cal. App. 4th 1455, 1468 (1995) (same); Offshore Rental Co. v. Continental Oil Co.,
583 P.2d 721 (Cal. 1978) (same); Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Cal.
1976). The seminal article advocating this approach is William Baxter, Choice of Law
and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REv. 1, 6-22 (1963).
206 See supra note 192 and accompanying text.
207 See, e.g., Erwin v. Thomas, 506 P.2d 494 (Or. 1973).
208 See Hurtado v. Superior Court, 522 P.2d 666 (Cal. 1974).
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Erie situation since there at least one of the jurisdictions, most likely
the state, will have some interest in the application of its rule.
Having briefly summarized this methodology, the question is
whether interest analysis may usefully be applied to vertical choice of
law decisions. I begin with a brief look at the quasi-interest analysis
used in this area by the Supreme Court.
Although Byrd and the first part of Gasperini209 came to opposite
results with respect to the trial judgejury relationship-Byrd applied
federal law, while Gasperini opted for use of the state rule-both re-
flect examples of characterizing the situation (whether correctly or
not) as a "false conflict." In Byrd, the Supreme Court not only empha-
sized the strong federal interest in using ajury as decisionmaker, but
significantly downplayed South Carolina's reasons for using the
judge210 to make these determinations. 211 By contrast, in that first
209 The part concerning the standard applicable to review by the trial judge of the
jury's verdict.
210 See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text. In fact, the state may have had
more significant interests. As suggested by Professor Howard Erichson of Seton Hall
Law School, South Carolina may have determined that for its workers' compensation
system to operate successfully, administrative relief must be exclusive. Allowing work-
ers to get judicial relief on a "technicality," because they found sympathetic jurors
willing to sanction this circumvention, would interfere with the tradeoffs involved in
making workers' compensation the exclusive remedy for on-thejob accidents.
211 In reviewing a draft of this Article, Professor William Richman of the University
of Toledo College of Law offered a more nuanced view of the Court's interest analysis
in Byrd. Because Justice Brennan substantially downplayed the significance that
South Carolina attached to its choice of the judge to determine the plaintiff's status as
a statutory employee, Professor Richman suggests that instead the appropriate weigh-
ing is between two competing federal policies-the previously described federal inter-
ests in favor of use of juries and in uniformity across the federal system, versus a
competing federal interest, which is implicated by the Erie doctrine, in deferring to
the state's chosen legal rule. Presumably the Byrd Court opted for use of the jury
because the former federal interests outweighed the latter.
Support for Professor Richman's reading of Byrd is found in Justice Brennan's
statement that "[w]e do not think that the likelihood of a different result is so strong
as to require the federal practice of jury determination of disputed factual issues to
yield to the state rule in the interest of uniformity of outcome." Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 540 (1958) (footnote omitted). This suggests
that some form of "balancing" must take place, and that if there were a greater likeli-
hood of a difference in outcome-thereby implicating more strongly the federal
courts' Erie interests-the other federal interests might yield.
Analogously, it is certainly true that in a horizontal setting, the forum state may
well find that either its, or the other state's, interests do not all point in the same
direction. See, e.g., Lilienthal v. Kaufman, 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964). Therefore, I
agree that it is equally appropriate in the vertical choice of law setting to acknowledge
that the federal interests may be conflicting and that the strength of those interests
may be diluted.
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part of Gasperini, the Court not only noted New York's "dominant in-
terest" in its more expansive review by the trial judge ofjury decisions
and the consequent reduction of excessive jury verdicts, 212 but also
appeared to minimize the federal interest in using its "shocks the con-
science" test.2 13
On the other hand, the second portion of Gasperini, in which the
Supreme Court insisted on following the federal standard with respect
to appellate review of jury verdicts, evidences a "true conflict." The
express language of the New York statute, requiring a heightened de-
gree ofjudicial review, was directed at its appellate courts; in fact, the
extension of that same degree of review to the state trial courts, which
was involved in the first part of the case, was the product of judicial
interpretation. As the Court noted, this legislation was the result of
the New York legislature's concern about excessive jury verdicts and
was not dissimilar from statutory caps on damage awards. Nonethe-
less, the Court concluded that the federal policies at stake, limiting
appellate review of jury verdicts, trumped New York's interests.21 4
However, there certainly must be room in this "balancing" process also to take
account of the state's interests. In any event, as I note at the end of this Article, the
use of either of these approaches will result in increased deference to state law in
many Erie situations.
212 The Court described the heightened standard ofjudicial review ofjury verdicts
as "part of a series of tort reform measures" enacted by the State Legislature, and
quoted from then-Governor Mario Cuomo's statement, on signing the bill, depicting
this provision as a step to "assure greater scrutiny of the amount of verdicts and pro-
mote greater stability in the tort system and greater fairness for similarly situated de-
fendants throughout the State." Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S.
415, 424 (1996).
213 In fact, there certainly are strong federal interests that could have been offered
for adhering to the "shocks the conscience" standard of review. Use of the state stan-
dard increases the likelihood that a jury verdict will be set aside, that appeals from
that decision will occur, and that second trials will have to take place. It would not be
unreasonable for the federal courts to prefer a rule that would minimize these bur-
dens on an already busy court system. Justice Ginsburg's failure even to mention
these concerns highlights the gaps in the Court's analysis and illustrates why this case
is not a clear-cut "false conflicts" situation.
214 In Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 437, the Court cited two of its earlier decisions, which
seemed to point to federal law as the standard to be used by both the trial and appellate
courts in reviewing jury verdicts. See Donovan v. Penn Shipping Co., 429 U.S. 648, 649
(1977) (per curiam) ("The proper role of the trial and appellate courts in the federal
system in reviewing the size ofjury verdicts is, however, a matter of federal law. .. ")
(citing Hanna and Byrd); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492
U.S. 257, 278-79 (1989) ("Federal law, however, will control on those issues involving
the proper review of the jury award by a federal district court and court of appeals.")
(citing Donovan). Although Gasperini then referred to New York's "dominant inter-
est" in the use of its "deviates materially" standard, there was no attempt either to
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These cases suggest an obvious conclusion: as with horizontal
analysis, 2 15 the resolution (and elimination) of Erie questions can best
be achieved by attempting to moderate the interest of one of the juris-
dictions and thus maximize the kinds of clashes that can be character-
ized as "false conflicts." 2 16 This will then yield the "easy" answer: apply
the rule of the jurisdiction-state or federal government-with the
only "real" interest.
However, if a choice between state and federal law is identified as
a "true conflict," the analysis must then differ. The Currie approach
of always applying forum law as the default2 17 cannot be employed
since that slights potentially superior state interests merely because
some federal interests are also present. Instead, the federal court may
first engage in a balancing or weighing of these interests.
Then, I propose that when the policies and the consequent inter-
ests are genuinely evenly balanced (or even in close balance), the fed-
eral court should defer to the state rule. Because of this, I would
assert that the second part of Gasperini-in which the Court had iden-
tified strong interests on the part of New York in the use of its rule-
was incorrectly decided and that the Supreme Court should have re-
quired deference to the state rule at both the trial and the appellate
levels.
I recognize the difficulties in applying the approach I suggest.
Unfortunately, as with other aspects of conflicts analysis, there are no
firm guideposts in the Erie setting, either for identifying state and fed-
eral interests or for differentiating "false" from "true" conflicts. Fur-
thermore, the characterization process lends itself to manipulation.
Nonetheless, I believe that good faith consideration of the policies
underlying Erie, and of the numerous differences identified through-
out this Article between horizontal and vertical analysis, would ad-
vance the goal of maximizing the "false conflicts" category, thereby
minimizing Erie problems.2 18
reconcile its holding with these earlier statements or to explain why that state interest
trumped only at the district court level.
215 See supra notes 188-202 and accompanying text.
216 This was indeed the route encouraged by Professor Currie in his proposed
"Restatement" of choice of law. See Currie, supra note 199, at 1242. ("If the court
finds an apparent conflict between the interests of the two states it should reconsider.
A more moderate and restrained interpretation of the policy or interest of one state
or the other may avoid conflict.").
217 See supra note 203 and accompanying text.
218 There are almost as many variations on interest analysis and other policy-based
approaches as there are states that have adopted these methodologies. So as to avoid
the creation of any additional Erie-type problem, the federal courts should use their
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Because of the differences in interests in the horizontal choice of
law context compared to state vs. federal issues, characterization of a
"clash" as a "false conflict," and subsequent deference to the state
rule, should be the norm. This is, in large measure, the result of the
fact that in an Erie situation, the kinds of contacts of the state and of
the federal government giving rise to these interests are themselves
quite different. In this vertical setting, since by definition the claim
arises under the law of one (or more) states, that state must have some
contacts with the matter in dispute to form the basis for that claim. By
contrast, the federal contacts are limited and the federal interest
arises only from its role as the place in which the dispute is being
resolved-affording the parties an alternative forum for resolving a
dispute, 21 9 perhaps freer from the parochialism that might character-
ize the state courts-but with the federal courts having no particular
interest in the substantive outcome of the dispute.220
own uniform kind of interest analysis, rather than having to defer to the choice of law
methodology of the state courts in the chosen forum.
219 Under various circumstances, even the asserted interest of the federal system
in providing a forum may be limited. In Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235
(1981), the defendants had initially removed wrongful death claims, which grew out
of an airplane crash in Scotland, to federal court. After a transfer to another district
court pursuant to § 1404(a), the defendants then made a motion-which was granted
by the district court-to have the actions dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds. Upholding that dismissal, the Supreme Court asserted that "Scotland has a
very strong interest in this litigation," id. at 260, while the benefits to American citi-
zens of imposing liability on the defendants were likely to be insignificant. The Court
therefore concluded that "It] he American interest in this accident is simply not suffi-
cient to justify the enormous commitment ofjudicial time and resources that would
inevitably be required if the case were to be tried here." Id. at 261. However, as
discussed below, see infra notes 223-26 and accompanying text, the standard of
whether to dismiss on grounds of forum non conveniens should be a federal one.
220 A similar analysis would apply in a Wortman-type situation, where the forum
state, while having sufficient contacts with the defendant to be able to exercise per-
sonaljurisdiction, lacked the requisite contacts for its substantive law to apply. None-
theless, Wortman concluded that the state still could apply its statute of limitations to
that transaction. Presumably, the forum state's legitimate interests included the use
of its own procedural rules in its courts, whether out of concern for uniformity or for
ease of administration.
An older, classic choice of law case, Home Insurance Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397
(1930), further illustrates the point. In an opinion by Justice Brandeis, the Court
concluded that the absence of sufficient contacts by Texas, the forum state, with a
dispute arising under an insurance policy issued in Mexico, and where the insured
event occurred in Mexico, meant that Texas' attempt to apply its own contract law
violated the Due Process Clause. Although the Court did not speak in those terms, it
might also have concluded that Texas did not have the requisite interest in the dis-
pute for its substantive rules to apply. In contrast, anticipating Wortman and other
later cases, Justice Brandeis did acknowledge that Texas "may prescribe the kind of
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In addition, in the horizontal situation, because there is a built-in
prejudice for application of the forum's own law, the court will often
tilt the scales towards strengthening its own state's interests and down-
playing those of other states. By contrast, in the Erie setting, the fed-
eral court's weighing of the conflicting interests should be more
neutral, thus leading to a greater frequency of "false conflicts."
It is true that in some cases there will be legitimate federal inter-
ests. Support for application of the federal rule will be particularly
strong when a constitutional provision (such as the Seventh Amend-
ment)221 or a federal statute222 lurks in the background. In most ar-
eas, however, the federal interests are smaller.
Some consideration must be given, however, to a different kind
of interest, which was discussed in Byrd: the strong federal interest in
maintaining an independent system ofjudicial administration, includ-
ing such essential characteristics as the allocation of certain responsi-
bilities to the jury. In the second part of Gasperini, although the Court
in fact did little to articulate actual federal concerns for applying the
federal standard of review at the appellate level, it could have pointed
to such interests as maintaining a particular relationship between trial
and appellate judges, perceptions about the comparative skills of
those judges (including the better ability that trial judges have to view
the evidence), and a desire to reduce somewhat the workload of the
federal appellate courts.
This kind of interest might also be present in a reverse- Guaranty
Trust situation. Assume that there had been a relevant federal statute
of limitations that had been shorter than New York State's statute.
The federal interests in cutting off stale claims and in controlling the
docket of the federal courts should be sufficient to permit application
of federal law, even if that yields a different outcome than would have
prevailed in the state court. Similarly, although it is a close question
for me, I believe that the federal courts' legitimate interests in control-
ling their dockets by dismissing an action with minimal connections to
the United States, and that could be far better heard in a foreign
court,223 would probably support resolving the question left open in
remedies to be available in its courts and dictate the practice and procedure to be
followed in pursuing those remedies." Id. at 409.
221 As already noted, this was the case in Byrd and Gasperini
222 Cf Stewart Org., v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988) (holding that the court
must apply a validly enacted federal procedural statute) (discussed supra notes 68-73
and accompanying text).
223 I have characterized the forum non conveniens determination as a choice be-
tween American and foreign courts because the assertion that a court in another dis-
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Piper Aircraft24-whether the federal or state standard of forum non
conveniens should be used in a diversity action 22 5-in favor of the
former.226
In contrast, however, state law should control if it differs from
federal common law principles with respect to forum selection clauses
or choice of law provisions. I have already criticized the Supreme
Court's decision in Stewart v. Ricoh for ignoring Alabama's policy of
refusing to defer to the parties' contractually agreed-upon choice of
forum, and instead concluding that § 1404(a) was dispositive of the
question.227 It follows that in the absence of a federal statute, the fed-
eral interest in controlling its docket by dismissing the lawsuit should
be found inadequate to outweigh a state's determination that such
actions should properly be heard in a court in the state rather than-
as would occur after a forum non conveniens dismissal-in the courts
of a foreign country.228
trict in the United States is preferable would normally be treated under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) (1994).
224 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
225 See id. at 248 n.13.
226 In Piper, the Court stated that courts making a forum non conveniens analysis
should apply the "private interest factors" and "public interest factors" previously
identified in Gulf Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). Piper, 454 U.S. at 241. The
private interests would presumably be similar in both state and federal court. How-
ever, the federal courts' unique concern for the public interests, which included "ad-
ministrative difficulties flowing from court congestion," id. at 241 n.6, and "the
unfairness of burdening citizens in an unrelated forum with jury duty," id., would be
strong support for application of a federal standard.
Although unresolved by the Supreme Court, the overwhelming majority of lower
federal courts to have considered the question agree with this conclusion. See Segu-
ros Comercial Am. S.A. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 105 F.3d 198, 199 (5th Cir.
1996); Rivendell Forest Prods., Ltd. v. Canadian Pac., Ltd., 2 F.3d 990, 991-92 (10th
Cir. 1993) (citing cases); In re Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, La. on July 9,
1982, 821 F.2d 1147, 1153-59 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[T]he interests of the federal forum
in self-regulation, in administrative independence, and in self-management are more
important than the disruption of uniformity created by applying federal forum non
conveniens in diversity cases."), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Pan Am. World Air-
ways v. Pampin Lopez, 490 U.S. 1032 (1989); Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215,
1218-19 (11th Cir. 1985) (applying federal rule, although "[w]e recognize that the
application of the federal, rather than the state, forum non conveniens rule alters the
outcome of this case"), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 (1985); Marsin Med. Int'l, Inc. v.
Bauhinia, Ltd., 948 F. Supp. 180, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Proyectos Orchimex de Costa
Rica v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 896 F. Supp. 1197, 1200 (M.D. Fla. 1995);
Torreblanca de Aguilar v. Boeing Co., 806 F. Supp. 139, 145 (E.D. Tex. 1992).
227 See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
228 While there is disagreement among the lower federal courts on this question,
the position for which I argue is admittedly inconsistent with the majority view. Com-
pare Haynsworth v. The Corporation, 121 F.3d 956, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating
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Another set of clashes which could benefit from analysis under
this methodology is differences in remedies, and specifically situations
in which federal courts have traditionally afforded equitable remedies
unavailable under state law. Although Justice Frankfurter specifically
noted in Guaranty Trust that federal courts were not bound by the
state's definition of remedies, 229 it would appear to be inconsistent
that federal law applies in both diversity and federal question actions to determine
enforceability of forum selection clauses and choice of law provisions);Jumara v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 877 (3d Cir. 1995) ("In federal court, the effect to be
given a contractual forum selection clause in diversity cases is determined by federal
not state law."); Spradlin v. Lear Siegler Management Servs. Co., 926 F.2d 865, 867
(9th Cir. 1990) (same); Jones v. Weibrecht, 901 F.2d 17, 19 (2d Cir. 1990) ("Ques-
tions of venue and the enforcement of forum selection clauses are essentially proce-
dural, rather than substantive, in nature."); Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Gucci, Am., Inc.,
858 F.2d 509, 512-13 (9th Cir. 1988) ("[Federal procedural interests raised by forum
selection clauses significantly outweigh the state interests.") (citing numerous cases);
Sun World Lines, Ltd. v. March Shipping Corp., 801 F.2d 1066, 1069 (8th Cir. 1986)
("In affirming the position ... that forum selection is a procedural matter, we support
a policy of uniformity of venue rules with the federal system."); and Kline v. Kawai
Am. Corp., 498 F. Supp. 868, 871 & n.1 (D. Minn. 1980), with Farmland Indus., Inc. v.
Frazier-Parrott Commodities, Inc., 806 F.2d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 1986) (holding that
because "choice of forum is an important contractual right of the parties" and
"[blecause of the close relationship between substance and procedure in this case we
believe that consideration should be given to the [state's] public policy") (receding
from Sun World Lines); General Eng'g Corp. v. Martin Marietta Alumina, Inc., 783
F.2d 352, 356-57 (3d Cir. 1986) (discerning no "strong federal interest or policy that
would displace state law" regarding interpretation of forum selection clause). See
Lambert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d 1110, 1116 & n.10 (1st Cir. 1992) (declining to resolve
"daunting question whether forum selection clauses are to be treated as substantive or
procedural for Erie purposes"); Instrumentation Assocs., Inc. v. Madsen Elecs. (Can-
ada), Ltd., 859 F.2d 4, 7 (3d Cir. 1988) (same); see also International Software Sys.,
Inc. v. Amplicon, Inc., 77 F.3d 112, 114-15 (1996) (applying, in case removed by
defendant from state court, federal standards based on MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972), to evaluate deference to be paid to forum selection clause and
holding that dismissal, rather than § 1404(a) transfer, was required, since contract
required suit to be brought in state court in another state); Alexander Proudfoot Co.
v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 912, 916-19 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding that state law, rather than
federal law, governs enforceability of clause in contract consenting to personal
jurisdiction).
See generally Stanley E. Cox, Case One: Choice of Forum Clauses, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV.
517 (1995) (presenting hypothetical on issue whether federal or state law controls
forum selection clauses, and including views of eight conflicts scholars); Richard D.
Freer, Erie's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1087. 1134-39 (1989); Stein, supra note
51; Robert A. de By, Note, Forum Selection Clauses: Substantive or Procedural for Erie
Purposes, 89 COLUM L. REV. 1068 (1989); Young Lee, Note, Forum Selection Clauses:
Problems of Enforcement in Diversity Cases and State Courts, 35 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
663 (1997).
229 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105-06 (1945).
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with the "twin aims" of Erie to allow a plaintiff to choose a federal
court to obtain an injunction or specific performance in situations in
which the state court, confronting the same facts, would deny that
relief. And, allowing that relief would interfere with the state's inter-
ests in defining not only duties, but lights between the parties, in a
situation in which the federal court had no strong countervailing
interest.23 0
These situations all present the importance of identifying a fed-
eral interest, which then is balanced against the state interest. Among
the potential federal concerns, in addition to those already discussed,
are interests in protecting the plaintiff, or in applying the "better" or
"fairer" legal rule,23' in promoting horizontal uniformity of law, or in
allowing practitioners and judges to predict with greater certainty the
substantive legal rule that will be applied in the federal courts. But,
because of the absence of power by the federal courts to create "gen-
eral common law," Erie itself forecloses those latter considerations. 23 2
Recognition of the limited legitimacy of these purported interests
demonstrates that in most cases, true federal interests will in fact be
limited.
Another frequently invoked federal interest is the achievement of
uniformity of result across the federal system. However, the impor-
tance of this goal has recently been downplayed by the Supreme
Court in several non-Erie contexts, 233 and is further undermined by
the flexibility, now under attack, that has been given to individual dis-
230 See generally David Crump, The Twilight Zone of the Erie Doctrine: Is There Really a
Different Choice of Equitable Remedies in the "Court A Block Away"?, 1991 Wis. L. REV. 1233.
231 See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERALJURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF
JUDICIAL POWER (1980). Redish noted:
[I]t does not automatically follow that the federal court's interest in
conducting its business in what it deems the fairest and most efficient man-
ner should never be relevant in a refined balancing test. Certainly there is
some legitimate interest in allowing a court to decide for itself how most
fairly to conduct its procedures. A court's integrity is to a degree dependent
upon its authority to control matters that are intimately bound up with its
daily internal operations.
Mdt at 194.
232 That is not to say that the federal courts' procedural interest is not linked with
its concern that substantive justice should be achieved. Cf FED. R. Civ. P. 1 ("[Rules]
shall be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive deter-
mination of every action.").
233 In Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986), the Court
squarely rejected the argument that the "powerful federal interest in seeing that the
federal statute is given uniform interpretations," id. at 815, supported conferring ju-
risdiction on the federal trial courts to exercise jurisdiction over a state-created cause
of action in which a federal issue was assertedly an essential element.
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trict courts to promulgate local rules234 or to opt-out of having to use
various Federal Rules.23 5 Yet other possible federal interests include
striving toward reduction of cost and advancing the convenience and
ease of application of laws.236 The problem is that these latter puta-
tive interests are universal-they are present in all cases (federal ques-
tion and diversity alike), and they usually are shared by the state
courts as well as the federal courts.23 7 Thus, in many ways, the invoca-
tion of these purely procedural interests should be recognized as a
makeweight.
Indeed, this paucity of legitimate, substantial federal interests in
the Erie setting can be usefully contrasted with the existence of real
federal interests in situations justifying the creation and application of
"federal common law." In United States v. Standard Oil Co., 2 3 8 the
Supreme Court weighed the potential imposition of liability on a pri-
vate party who had negligently injured an American soldier whose
hospitalization and other costs had then been borne by the federal
government. Although noting that this 1947 case was the first time
since Erie that the Court was "asked to create a new substantive legal
liability without legislative aid and as at the common law,"23 9 it
stressed that this case presented markedly different considerations
than Erie.24
0
In O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994), the Court declined to create a
federal common law rule to govern the imputation of knowledge by corporate officers
to a corporation, rejecting potential reliance on "that most generic (and lightly in-
voked) of alleged federal interests, the interest in uniformity." Id at 88.
234 See FED. R. Crv. P. 83 (requiring that "local rule[s] shall be consistent with-
but not duplicative of-Acts of Congress and rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. § 2072
and 2075").
235 See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 26(a) (permitting court to provide by order or local
rule that required disclosure rules will not apply).
236 See Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 357
(1991) (noting "federal interests in predictability and judicial economy").
237 An example of a strong federal procedural interest that is not shared by the
state courts, and that supports application of the federal rule, is found in Chambers v.
Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32 (1991). Federal judge-made law permitted the imposition of
penalties on contumacious parties in situations where such sanctions were unavailable
under state law. Asserting that the ability to impose those sanctions was necessary to
vindicate federal judicial authority, the Court stated that "[w] e do not see how the
district court's inherent power to tax fees for that conduct can be made subservient to
any state policy without transgressing the boundaries set out in Erie, Guaranty Trust Co.
and Hanna." Id. at 55 (quoting from court of appeals decision, Nacso, Inc. v. Cham-
bers, 894 F.2d 696, 705 (5th Cir. 1990)).
238 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
239 Id. at 302.
240 See id at 307 ("[T] he Erie decision, which related only to the law to be applied
in the exercise of [diversity] jurisdiction, had no effect, and was intended to have
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In Erie, the federal courts had to follow state law because the sub-
ject matter of the dispute involved "matters essentially of local interest
and state control."241 Although the Court in Standard Oil eventually
decided not to impose liability,24 2 it nonetheless identified and con-
trasted the situations in which federal common law could appropri-
ately be created: matters "vitally affecting interests, powers and
relations of the Federal Government as to require uniform national
disposition rather than diversified state rulings."243
none, to bring within the governance of state law matters exclusively federal .... ."); see
also City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 334 (1981) ("The Court [in
Erie] ... did not there upset, nor has it since disturbed, a deeply rooted, more special-
ized federal common law that has arisen to effectuate federal interests embodied
either in the Constitution or an Act of Congress.") (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (foot-
note omitted); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943)
("The rights and duties of the United States on commercial paper which it issues are
governed by federal rather than local law .... In absence of an applicable Act of
Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law according to
their own standards.") (distinguishing Erie).
241 Standard Oi4 332 U.S. at 307 ("It was the so-called 'federal common law' uti-
lized as a substitute for state power, to create and enforce legal relationships in the
area set apart in our scheme for state rather than for federal control, that the Erie
decision threw out. Its object and effect were thus to bring federal judicial power
under subjection to state authority in matters essentially of local interest and state
control.").
As noted above, see supra note 34, it is likely that today the Supreme Court would
conclude that the Congress has power to legislate with respect to the duty owed by
interstate railroads to persons walking on their rights-of-way. It still does not follow
that in the absence of such legislation, the federal courts have the ability to create
rules in this area pursuant to their common law powers. Even if the Constitution does
not dictate this result-and the absence of such power may be inferred from the
arguably limited grant of authority in Article III for the Congress to create inferior
lower courts, but not vesting them with such "law-making" power-this result must
flow from the Rules of Decision Act.
242 The Court ultimately concluded that congressional inaction dictated that the
question of liability should be resolved legislatively rather than judicially. See id. at
311-17.
243 Id. at 307. The Court further distinguished this category from the Erie
situation:
[E]xcept where the Government has simply substituted itself for others
as successor to rights governed by state law, the question is one of federal
policy, affecting not merely the federal judicial establishment and the
groundings of its action, but also the Government's legal interests and rela-
tions, a factor not controlling in the types of cases producing and governed
by the Erie ruling.
Id. at 309-10.
See also Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966) ("In deciding
whether rules of federal common law should be fashioned, normally the guiding prin-
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Subsequent decisions have made clear that this standard is not
easily met: there must be substantial federal interests to justify the cre-
ation of federal common law. 24 4 Situations where such law may be
created are "few and restricted, '245 and are "limited to situations
where there is a 'significant conflict between some federal policy or
interest and the use of state law.'- 246
This insistence on strong and genuine federal interests as a con-
dition for the creation of federal common law would suggest that the
situations in which meaningful federal interests exist in an Erie setting
are limited and that many assertions of a federal interest can eventu-
ally be reduced to "false conflicts. ' 247 Thus, one conclusion from this
analysis would be the creation of a presumption that most clashes
ciple is that a significant conflict between some federal policy or interest and the use
of state law in the premises must first be specifically shown.").
The importance of uniformity as a federal interest is reflected in Dice v. Akron,
Canton & Youngstown R.R. Co., 342 U.S. 359 (1952). A railroad fireman brought an
action under the Federal Employers' Liability Act in state court; one issue was the
validity of a release given by the employee. After a jury verdict for the plaintiff, the
trial court, applying state law, granted the defendant's motion for a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. In reversing that ruling, the Supreme Court initially
stated that the "validity of releases under the . . . Act raises a federal question to be
determined by federal rather than state law," id. at 361, because "only if federal law
controls can the federal Act be given the uniform application throughout the country
essential to effectuate its purposes." &d Without mentioning Erie, the Court also as-
serted "that the right to trial by jury is too substantial a part of the rights accorded by
the Act to permit it to be classified as a mere 'local rule of procedure' for denial in
the manner that Ohio has here used." Id. at 363.
244 See Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972) ("[W]here there is
an overriding federal interest in the need for a uniform rule of decision or where the
controversy touches basic interests of federalism, we have fashioned federal common
law.").
245 See Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647, 651 (1963) ("As respects the creation
by the federal courts of common-law rights, it is perhaps needless to state that we are
not in the free-wheeling days antedating [Erie]. The instances where we have created
federal common law are few and restricted.").
246 O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87 (1994) (quoting Wallis, 384 U.S. at
68) (adding that "[o]ur cases uniformly require the existence of such a conflict as a
precondition for recognition of a federal rule of decision"). See Atherton v. FDIC,
519 U.S. 213, 224-25, (1997) (declining to create federal common law rule in ab-
sence of "significant conflict with, or threat to, a federal interest").
247 By analogy, the Court has insisted that preemption of state law in the face of
allegedly inconsistent federal law will "occur only where a particular state require-
ment threatens to interfere with a specific federal interest." Lohr v. Medtronic, Inc.,
518 U.S. 470, 500 (1996). Previously, the Court had stated that preemption would
occur if "the Act of Congress ... touch [es] a field in which the federal interest is so
dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state
laws on the same subject." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
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present "false conflicts" and that therefore state law should be fol-
lowed when it differs from federal judge-made law.
However, there will nonetheless be situations that present "true
conflicts." Three steps are once again needed to make use of the
methodologies drawn from the conflicts area to resolve these Erie situ-
ations. In each case, the federal courts must clearly define the policies
underlying the conflicting rules. They must then identify the compet-
ing state and federal interests implicated by the application of those
rules. And finally, they must begin to develop clearer standards for
balancing those interests.2 48
For example, in the first part of Gasperini, the Supreme Court was
sensitive to identifying the nature of New York's "dominant interest"
in the heightened standard of review-the "false conflicts" situa-
tion.2 49 By contrast, the portion of the decision dealing with appellate
review-the "true conflicts" situation-described the presence of
"countervailing federal interests," based in part on the "essential char-
acteristics" of the federal system. However, the Court's identification
of the purported source and nature of these federal interests250 (in
contrast to their absence at the trial level), as well as the apparent
absence of strong state interests, stands as an excellent example of the
248 But see 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 4508, at 242 (2d ed. 1996) ("The major difficulty with the Byrd analysis stemmed
from the fact that there is no scale on which the balancing process called for by the
Court can take place. There is no way to say with assurance in a particular case that
the federal interest asserted is more or less important than the value of preserving
uniformity of result with the state court. Even if there were such a scale, the weights
to be placed upon it must be whatever the judges say they are.").
249 See supra notes 114 & 212-13.
250 The Court merely stated, in conclusory form, that there was a strong federal
interest in restricting federal appellate review of jury decisions:
Parallel application of § 5501(c) at the federal appellate level would be
out of sync with the federal system's division of trial and appellate court
functions, an allocation weighted by the Seventh Amendment.
Within the federal system, practical reasons combine with Seventh
Amendment constraints to lodge in the district court, not the court of ap-
peals, primary responsibility for application of § 5501(c)'s "deviates mark-
edly" check.
Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 426 (1996).
Yet apart from the Seventh Amendment concerns, it is hardly clear why limiting
appellate review to a determination whether the trial court's failure to set aside a
verdict was an "abuse of discretion" constitutes an "essential characteristic" of the fed-
eral system any more so than the standard of review at the -trial level.
Some of the reasons for following the federal standard that could have been
offered are set forth supra note 213 and accompanying text.
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ipse dixit approach to law rather than an attempt at genuine analy-
sis.251 Therefore, the opinion provides little insight into how another
court would ascertain whether such interests existed in other
situations. 252
Of equal importance, what is to happen after the federal and
state interests are identified and defined and a true conflict remains?
The resolution of "true conflicts" is among the most difficult tasks in
choice of law analysis. I have deliberately chosen neither to synthesize
previously offered solutions253 nor to offer yet another new approach.
Instead, the hoped-for contribution of this Article is the demonstra-
tion that additional coherence can be given to Erie analysis by the in-
vocation of horizontally derived, policy-based choice of law analysis. I
would expect that a combination of the choice of law experiences of
the state courts in the last three decades, and the various suggestions
of numerous academics, would allow the federal system to develop its
own formulae for resolving conflicts in the vertical setting.
As already indicated, this proposed avenue of inquiry often will
require a balancing or weighing of competing policies and interests.
But far greater specificity will be needed with regard to the weight to
be given to each of the factors on the two sides of the scale. It is true
that many other areas of law are also characterized by "three part or
four part tests" 254 or a "balancing analysis '255 (and that these ap-
251 See Rowe, supra note 109, at 986 ("More consequential for where Erie-Hanna
analyses stand after Gasperini is the unanswered question of what constitutes an "es-
sential characteristic of the federal judicial system" or a "countervailing federal inter-
est" in a judge-made federal procedural rule, calling for consideration of state and
federal interests as well as likely outcome effects and leading to balancing or
accommodation.").
252 An issue similar to that at stake in Gasperini was noted, but then left un-
resolved, in Dick v. New York Life Insurance Co., 359 U.S. 437 (1959): "whether it is
proper to apply a state or federal test of sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury
verdict where federal jurisdiction is rested on diversity of citizenship," id. at 444-45.
Because the issue had not been properly briefed or argued, and because it was not
clear that the federal and state standards differed, the Court decided to leave resolu-
tion of this question to a subsequent case. The analysis above, however, would sup-
port the prevailing lower court view of this question-that the use of a uniform
federal standard is sufficiently important, and that the standard is one of the "essen-
tial characteristics" of a federal trial, such that an inconsistent state standard should
not govern. 9A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 248, at § 2525 (collecting cases)
253 See supra notes 203-06 and accompanying text.
254 See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24-29 (1981) (deter-
mining whether "fundamental fairness" requirement of Due Process Clause compels
appointment of counsel for indigent persons in parental status termination proceed-
ing involves balancing of three factors and then weighing them against specified pre-
sumption); Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm., 447 U.S. 557
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proaches have been subject to substantial criticism). But as is also true
with too many of those, all we know from Byrd and Gasperini are the
outcomes, with no suggestion of how the balancing was done.
Thus, if this approach is to be helpful, the Court will have to de-
scribe how the weighing is to be performed, and not merely cough out
the result. This part of interest analysis could be very useful, but only
if past results do not appear to be arbitrary and if future results have
some measure of predictability. Finally, I reiterate my proposed solu-
tion when this analysis indicates that the federal and state policies and
the consequent interests are genuinely evenly balanced (or even in
close balance): the federal court should defer to the state rule.2 56
CONCLUSION
This inquiry was undertaken in an attempt to determine the ex-
tent to which learning from the conflict of laws realm might help in-
form Erie analysis. Since both horizontal and vertical choice of law
questions involve choosing between the legal rules of two jurisdic-
tions, 257 at first blush it would seem that there would be significant
spillover. Yet, in many respects the differences are more significant
than the similarities.
Nonetheless, the invocation of some of the methodology from
the conflicts area should prove beneficial both in eliminating some,
and resolving other, vertical choice of law questions. First, the interest
analysis approach and its attempt, through the identification of "false
conflicts," to dispose of some putative conflicts would help to reduce
the number of cases that raise Erie problems and thus would minimize
the situations in which the full Hanna analysis will be required. Sec-
ond, with regard to that subset of cases involving clashes between state
(1980) (four part test for measuring protection given to commercial speech); Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (three part test for determining violations of Estab-
lishment Clause); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (three part test, fo-
cusing on time, place, and manner, to evaluate scope of protection under Free
Speech Clause).
255 See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970); Pickering v. Board of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
256 In an article written twenty-five years ago, John R. Leathers suggested that "the
problems of the true conflict [may be partially avoided] by virtue of [the] position
that the choices involved in Eie and its progeny are all false conflicts." Leathers,
supra note 108, at 793. Retreating from this, he then proposed that when interest
analysis revealed "both relevant state and federal policies on a particular issue ... the
central government must be supreme." Id. at 824. As indicated, my conclusions dif-
fer on both counts.
257 In the horizontal setting, the rules of more than two states may be involved, but
that is of no significance for Erie purposes.
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rules of a procedural nature and federal judge-made law, learning
drawn from more modem policy-based choice of law principles would
help to resolve the choice where "true conflicts" exist by providing a
methodology for reconciling these interests. The use of this approach
should impart greater predictability and rationality to vertical choice
of law situations. As a practical matter, it also would probably result in
more frequent application of the state's rule.
